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ABSTRACT 
International Ship and Port Facility Security (ISPS) Code was developed by 
International Maritime Organization (IMO) to provide procedures and 
measures to prevent piracy, robbery, terrorism, and other criminal acts in 
international trade. Terrorism and criminal acts such as cargo theft, 
smuggling, piracy/armed robbery, etc. that happen in ships and ports will 
crippled operation and portray a bad image. 14 years after it came into force, 
the implementation of International Ship and Port Facility Security (ISPS) Code 
in Indonesia is still a poor one. Proven by the most recent crimes happened 
in Port Belawan at 10th July 2018 and in Terminal Marunda Centre at 13th 
August 2018 that was caused by armed robbery.  
The Intensity of criminal acts especially piracy, armed robbery, and petty 
theft in Indonesia is quite high. Based on ICC International Maritime Bureau 
annual report of Piracy and Armed Robbery 2014-2018, Indonesia has the 
highest crime rate in Southeast Asia. In order to tackle this issue, a model 
using Bayesian network for predicting the likelihood of a ship being attacked 
by pirates and robbers is proposed in this research. Bayesian Network Model 
in this research is developed and tested using NETICA Software. A sensitivity 
analysis is done to the model created to provide a certain degree of 
confidence that the model creating is working properly. From the model 
created it was found that Situation hold a significant impact on the likelihood 
of an attack happened in Port of Tanjung Perak. A well-guarded situation of 
the port can reduce the likelihood of an attack up to 26.6% reducing the 
likelihood of an attack to 0.315 from the current situation 0.585. Based on this 
finding, suggestion for improvements of security protection to reduce 
number of piracy and robbery attack in the future.  
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ABSTRAK 
Kode Keamanan Kapal dan Fasilitas Pelabuhan Internasional (ISPS) 
dikembangkan oleh Organisasi Maritim Internasional (IMO) untuk 
menyediakan langkah-langkah dan prosedur untuk mencegah pembajakan, 
terorisme, dan tindakan kriminal lainnya, yang mengancam keamanan 
penumpang, awak kapal, keselamatan kapal dan pelabuhan fasilitas yang 
digunakan dalam perdagangan internasional. Terorisme dan tindakan 
kriminal seperti pencurian kargo, penyelundupan, pembajakan / perampokan 
bersenjata, dll. Yang terjadi di kapal dan pelabuhan akan melumpuhkan 
operasi dan menggambarkan citra yang buruk. 14 tahun setelah diberlakukan, 
penerapan Kode Keamanan Kapal dan Keamanan Pelabuhan Internasional 
(ISPS) di Indonesia masih sangat buruk. Terbukti oleh kejahatan terbaru yang 
terjadi di Port Belawan pada 10 Juli 2018 dan di Terminal Marunda Center 
pada 13 Agustus 2018 yang disebabkan oleh perampokan bersenjata. 
Intensitas tindakan kriminal terutama pembajakan, perampokan bersenjata, 
dan pencurian kecil di Indonesia cukup tinggi. Berdasarkan laporan tahunan 
ICC International Maritime Bureau tentang Pembajakan dan Perampokan 
Bersenjata 2014-2018, Indonesia memiliki tingkat kejahatan tertinggi di Asia 
Tenggara. Untuk mengatasi masalah ini, sebuah model menggunakan 
jaringan Bayesian untuk memprediksi kemungkinan kapal diserang oleh bajak 
laut dan perampok diusulkan dalam penelitian ini. Bayesian Network Model 
dalam penelitian ini dikembangkan dan diuji menggunakan Perangkat Lunak 
NETICA. Analisis sensitivitas dilakukan untuk model yang dibuat untuk 
memberikan tingkat kepercayaan tertentu bahwa pembuatan model 
berfungsi dengan baik. Dari model yang dibuat ditemukan bahwa Situation 
memiliki dampak yang signifikan terhadap kemungkinan serangan yang 
terjadi di Pelabuhan Tanjung Perak. Situasi pelabuhan yang dijaga dengan 
baik dapat mengurangi kemungkinan serangan hingga 26,6% mengurangi 
kemungkinan serangan menjadi 0,315 dari situasi saat ini 0,585. Berdasarkan 
 xviii 
hasil tersebut, saran untuk perbaikan perlindungan keamanan untuk 
mengurangi jumlah pembajakan dan serangan perampokan di masa depan. 
 
Kata kunci: ISPS Code, Pembajakan dan Perampokan, Model Jaringan 
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As a crucial part of global business, shipping industry conveys almost 
90 % of the world trade volumes. Meaning, that number of ships have to 
carry cargoes between ports is very large. As it is so crucial, any threat or 
accident happened in this cycle will affect global economics. With the 
tendency of ships or ports having the likelihood of getting caught in an 
unwanted situation regarding security issues.  
Security issues such as piracy, terrorism, and other criminal activities 
in shipping business is not a new concern. It already is a concern since the 
first-time ship introduced. But the issues had not been taken into a serious 
note until the attack on passenger vessels Achille Lauro and City of Poros 
in 1985 and 1989 respectively. The accident happened made International 
Maritime Organization (IMO) adopted a Convention on the Suppression 
of Unlawful Acts (SUA) which embody advices regarding security for ships 
in 1986.  
Then, the horrific event of terrorist attack at the World Trade Centre 
on 11th September 2001 happened. It shocked the world with a graphical 
demonstration of what terrorist attack will go to an extraordinary extent. 
The horrific event of which involving aircraft, changed the perspectives 
dramatically as ship cargoes, and ports are perceived that they can be 
used as a targets, weapon or locations of attacks. It then triggered 
International Maritime Organization (IMO) to held The 22nd session of the 
assembly in November 2001 to create an instrument in order to deter and 
prevent piracy, terrorism, and other criminal acts against maritime target.  
The assembly later on became International Ship and Port Facility 
Security (ISPS) Code consisted in amendment of SOLAS 1974 Chapter XI-
2. International Ship and Port Facility Security (ISPS) Code came into forces 
1st July 2004. The code was developed to provide measures and 
procedures to prevent piracy, terrorism, and other criminal acts, which 
threaten the security of passengers, crew, the safety of ships and port 
facilities used in international trade. Terrorism and criminal acts such as 
cargo theft, smuggling, piracy/armed robbery, etc. that happen in ships 





Implementation of International Ship and Port Facility Security (ISPS) 
Code will help to curb these criminal activities and in turn improve 
operations in ship and port. As one of the member states of International 
Maritime Organization (IMO) Indonesia has to implement the code. 14 
years later after it came into force, the implementation of International 
Ship and Port Facility Security (ISPS) Code in Indonesia is still a poor one. 
Proven by the most recent crimes happened in Port Belawan at 10th July 
2018 and in Terminal Marunda Center at 13th August 2018 that was caused 
by armed robbery.  
The Intensity of criminal acts especially piracy, armed robbery, and 
petty theft in Indonesia is quite high. Based on ICC International Maritime 
Bureau annual report of Piracy and Armed Robbery 2014-2018, Indonesia 
has the highest crime rate in Southeast Asia.  
 
Table 1. 1 Actual and attempted attack in January - June 2014 - 2018 
Location 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 
SE ASIA        Indonesia 47 54 24 19 25 
Mallaca Straits 1 3    
Malaysia 9 11 4 3 2 
Philipphines 2 4 3 13 3 
Singapore Straits 6 6  1  













Figure 1. 1 Country contributed to 75% of the total of 106 incidents reported in January – June 2018 





From figures 1.1 we can see that Indonesia is the 2nd most frequent piracy 
and robbery attack happen. With such numbers of security threat happen in 
Indonesian ports it will cause trading-partner feeling unsafe and portray a bad 
image. This will affect Indonesia’s economies especially local economies of the 
port industry.  
In order to tackle this issue, a model using Bayesian network for predicting 
the likelihood of a ship being attacked by pirates and is proposed robbers in 
this research, due to characteristics of piracy and robbery threat is, to some 
extent, predictable depending on sea areas (Low Risk Areas or High Risks 
Area), weather conditions, and security measures in place. Model produced 
will be tested using NETICA Software to identify sensitivity of the model to 
provide a degree of confidence that the model has been built correctly and is 
working as intended. This model will predict the best scenario that leads to 
successful attacks given by the characteristics of the ship, environment 
conditions and the maritime security measures in place. From this scenario, 
improvements for future security protection complementing ISPS Code could 
be addressed more effectively to reduce number of piracy and robbery in 
Indonesia.  
 
1.2. Research Problem 
1) How to determine variables that potentially leads to successful 
attacks of piracy and robbery. 
2) How to develop a model to estimate the likelihood of success 
attack of piracy and robbery in Port Tanjung Perak.   
3) How to make a recommendation anti-piracy and anti-robbery 
decision by maritime stakeholders in operation. 
 
1.3. Research Limitation 
1) Port assessed in this research limited in Port Tanjung Perak 
(Terminal Jamrud, Terminal Gapura Surya Nusantara, and Terminal 
Petikemas Surabaya). 
2) Ships assessed in this study is ships with international voyage and 
flag.  
 
1.4. Research Objectives 
1) Determine variables that potentially leads to successful attacks of 





2) Develop a model to estimate the likelihood of success attack of 
piracy and robbery in Port Tanjung Perak. 
3) Make a recommendation anti-piracy and anti-robbery decision by 
maritime stakeholders in operation. 
 
1.5. Research Benefits 
1) The model proposed can be used as a standalone technique to 
update the estimation of the probability of ships being attack by 
pirates and robbers in Port Tanjung Perak when a there is a new 
available information. 
2) The model proposed can also be used to make operational 
security-based decision by maritime stakeholders. 
3) The results of the research provided will be additional advice in 










2.1 ISPS CODE 
International Ship and Port Facility Security (ISPS) Code is an 
amendment result of International Maritime Organization (IMO) 22nd  
sessions assembly in November 2001 to the Safety of Life at Sea (SOLAS) 
Convention (1974/1988). The amendment is carried out in Chapter V 
Safety of Navigation and additions to Chapter XI become Chapter XI-1 
concerning special measures to improve shipping safety (special 
measures to enhance maritime safety) and Chapter XII-2 steps - special 
measures to improve shipping security (special measures to enhance 
maritime safety), known as the International Ship and Port Facility 
Security Code (ISPS Code) or International Code for Ship Security and 
Port Facilities. The purpose of this code is to establish an international 
and national framework focusing on protection of ship and port facility 
security from terrorism, piratical and other criminal activities, and increase 
awareness of preventive action against unlawful acts. ISPS Code is applied 
to ports and ship with a criterias: 
• Passenger ships, including high-speed passenger craft; 
• Cargo ships, including high-speed craft, of 500 gross tonnage and 
upwards;  
• Mobile offshore drilling units; 
• Port facilities serving such ships engaged on international 
voyages.  
ISPS Code is divided into 2 parts, part A and part B. Part A regulates 
mandatory requirements of which consist of 19 subsections concerning 
goal of the code and demands on ships and in port facilities. Meanwhile 
part B is a guidance regarding the provisions of part A such as contracting 
governments responsibilities. It also concerns about establishing the vital 
issues of the code which is security levels. The ISPS code serves in building 
a framework that involves cooperation between the governments of 
signatory countries, government agencies, local governments and the 
shipping and port industries to identify security threats and take 
precautionary measures against security events that affect ships and or 
port facilities used for international trade (Budiyanto & Gurning, 2015). 





responsibilities of signatory governments, government agencies, local 
government, shipping industry and port industry, at the national and 
international level to ensure maritime security. The code also ensures 
early and successful collection of information and exchanges related to 
security by providing a method for security assessment for which the plan 
must exist and the procedure for responding to changes in security level. 
 
2.1.1 Obligation of Contracting Governments 
Contracting governments has a critical responsibility to the successful 
implementation and enforcement of the Code. Contracting Government 
is the authority decides maritime security level for the ships with their 
flag-state and ports within their jurisdictions. Flag states have the 
responsibility to provide guidance for protection from security incidents 
for the ships flying their flag and where to heightened security measures 
and levels. Appropriate security information related to shipping industry 
both the ships and port facilities also have to be provided. Contracting 
government also has the responsibility to ensure implementation on 
appropriate maritime security culture within its nation. Creating 
complimentary rules to support security practices in the region is also a 
part of obligation by contracting governments. Below are several various 
responsibilities of contracting government, amongst others include the 
following: 
• Establish the Designated Authority (DA) 
• Appoint Recognized Security Organization (RSO) 
• Establish the level of security (Security Level) 
• Endorsement of Port Facility Security Assessment (PFSA) and Port 
Facility Security Plan (PFSP) 
• Ratification of the Ship Security Plan (SSP) 
• Verification and certification 
• Establish requirements for the Security Declaration or Declaration 
of Security (DoS) 
• Convey information to International Maritime Organization (IMO) 
and to shipping industries port 
• Supervision 
 
2.1.1.1. Designated Authority (DA) 
Designated Authority (DA) is a known organizer within the 
government who entered into an agreement as responsible institution for 




Port Facility Security (ISPS) Code which pertains to the security of port 
facilities and ship or port relations from the point of view of port facilities. 
Designated Authority in Indonesia is Director General of Sea 
Transportation. 
 
2.1.1.2. Ship Security Plan (SSP) 
Ship Security Plan is a plan made to ensure the application of steps or 
actions on ships designed to protect humans on ships, cargo, cargo 
transportation units, supplies of ships or their own ships from the risk of 
security events. 
 
2.1.1.3. Port Facility Security Plan (PFSP) 
Port Facility Security Plan is a plan that is built to ensure the application 
of the steps or actions planned to protect port facilities and ships, 
humans, cargo, cargo transportation units and ship supplies in port 
facilities from the risk of security events / events. 
 
2.1.1.4. Ship Security Officer (SSO) 
Ship Security Officer is personnel on board, who are responsible to the 
captain for the security of the ship, including the implementation and 
maintenance of the ship's security plan and to coordinate with company 
security officers and port facility security officers. 
 
2.1.1.5. Company Security Officer (CSO) 
Company Security Officer is the personnel assigned by the company 
to ensure that the ship's security assessment has been carried out. That 
the ship's security plan is strengthened, delivered for approval, and then 
implements and maintains it. Company Security Officer also responsible 
for dealing with port facility officers and ship security officers. 
 
2.1.1.6. Port Facility Security Officer (PFSO) 
Port Facility Security Officer is personnel assigned to be responsible 
for the development, implementation, change and maintenance of port 
facility security plan and for dealing with ship security officers and 
company security officers. 
 
2.1.1.7. Declaration of Security (DoS) 
Declaration of Security is an agreement reached between a ship and a 





security requirements that could be shared between a port facility and a 
ship, or between ships, and states the responsibility for each. Declaration 
of Security can also set security measures that will be implemented. 
 
2.1.1.8. Recognized Security Organization (RSO) 
Recognized Security Organization is an organization with appropriate 
expertise in the field of security and with appropriate knowledge in the 
field of ship and port operations. The duties and authorities of RSO are 
determined by the Director General of Sea Transportation based on the 
provisions, capacities and applications submitted by each RSO candidate, 
but do not exceed the following limits:  
• Carry out a security assessment (SSA and PFSA) 
• Development of security planning (SSP and PFSP) 
• Validation of assessment and planning ship security (SSP) 
• Verification of planning implementation ship security (SSP) 
• Issuance of International Ship Security Certificate (ISSC) 
In Indonesia, Recognized Security Organization is Kesyahbandaran 
dan Otoritas Pelabuhan (Harbour Master).  
 
2.1.1.9. Port Security Committee (PSC) 
Port Security Committee is an organization consisting of the Port 
Administration Office with the Port Office as the coordinator, Head of the 
Guard and Rescue as Implementing Coordinator and Agency 
Representative. Port Security Committee in general has the responsibility 
such: 
• Preparation of port communication, information and intelligence 
networks.  
• Identify the threat and vulnerability of the port 
• Develop procedures and port security systems to minimize 
security threat. 
 
2.1.1.10. Port Security Officer (PSO) 
Port Security Officer is the official of the Head of the Division of 
Security and Rescue as the Port Security Coordinator. PSO is personnel 
responsible for the development, implementation, revision, and maintenance 
of the port facility security plan and for dealing with the port authorities 






Verification is the act of inspection or audit of Ship Security Plan (SSP), 
and or Port Facility Security Plan (PFSP) and all related provisions and 
procedures in ship and port security plan that must be fulfilled in 
compliance to International Ship and Port Facility Security (ISPS) Code. 
 
2.1.2 Security Level 
Maritime security level established into 3 different levels of which 
every level has a specific procedures and standards. Certain security level 
operated on ships will be instructed from Flag-state Administration or as 
determined by master. For port facility, it will operate at certain Security 
Level as determined by the Port Facility Security Officer (PFSO) or 
instructed by Designated Authority (DA) of Contracting Government. 
• Level 1 
Security level 1 defined as condition where minimum appropriate 
protective security measures shall be maintained at all times.  
• Level 2 
Security level 2 defined as condition where appropriate additional 
protective security measures shall be maintained for a period of 
time as a result of heightened risk of a security incident.  
• Level 3 
Security level 3 defined as condition where Further specific 
protective security measures shall be maintained for a limited 
period of time when a security incident is probable or imminent, 
although it may not be possible to identify the specific target.  
 
2.1.3 Shipping Company Responsibility 
Shipping company must posses International Ship Security Certificate 
for each operating vessel and ensure it is available onboard at all times 
for inspection. According to the ISPS Code the following measures are 
mandatory for shipping company: 
• Appointment of Company Security Officer; 
• Appointment of Ship Security Officer (SSO);  
• Ship Security Assessment (SSA) and install proper Ship Safety 
Alert System (SSAS) onboard; 
• Approved and fully educated crew of Ship Security Plan (SSP) on 
board 
• Ensure appropriate security training, drills, and exercises; 







2.1.4 Port Authority Responsibility 
ISPS Code required port authority to have following mandatory 
measures in compliance with the code: 
• Appointment of Port Facility Security Officer (PFSO); 
• Approved Port Facility Security Assessment (PFSA); 
• Approved Port Facility Security Plan (PFSP); 
• Provide appropriate education, training, drills, and exercise for 
port facility personnel;  
• Establish good communication and information flow towards the 
ships entering the port via a ship security officer (SSO), through a 
port facility security officer (PFSO) and to the responsible 
government handling the ISPS Code related issues within the 
country. 
 
2.2 Maritime Piracy and Robbery 
Maritime Security is defined as “the advancement and protection of a 
nation’s interests, at home and abroad, through the active management 
of risks and opportunities in and from the maritime domain, in order to 
strengthen and extend nation’s prosperity, security, and resilience and to 
help shape a stable world” (HM Government,2014). Maritime security 
issues include terrorism, piracy and robbery attacks, transportation of 
illegal items, people smuggling, and human trafficking. As one of the 
concerns of maritime security issues, maritime piracy and robbery is 
regulated under International Ship and Port Facility Security (ISPS) Code. 
Due to its effect, maritime piracy and robbery can cause not only 
disruption in supply chain but it also leads to economic consequences, 
loss of lives, short and long terms health problem of seafarers and 
passengers. Maritime piracy and robbery attacks to some extent is 
predictable depend on sea areas (piracy low risk area and high risks area), 
weather conditions and or Best Management Practices (Schneider P, 
2012). 
 
2.2.1 Maritime Piracy and Robbery Pattern 
 International organizations and shipping industry have made 
enormous effort to overcome piracy and robbery attacks. But piracy and 
robbery attack evolve within years. Modern pirates use state-of-the-art 
equipment in their operations (Psarros G, 2011). With crimes ranging 




threat from maritime piracy came in the late 1990s. Based on IMO 
monthly piracy reports in 2000-2009 data it was found that incident of 
piracy In South China Sea and Malacca Strait led to more death compared 
to African continent.  
 
Table 2. 1 All incident of piracy and armed robbery from 1 July 1994 - 1 December 2014 
(Source: IMO GISIS database) 
 
 Figures above shows ship type that is mostly attacked is bulk carriers 
followed by tankers and general cargo ships. Based on data shown, 
characteristic of ship having slow speed and low freeboard having more 
tendency of becoming a piracy victim (Sascha P, 2016).  
 
2.2.2 Maritime Piracy in Southeast Asia 
 Piracy threat in this region usually aiming to ransack ship limited to 
ship stores and crew valuables. Many cases of attack are happening when 
ships were at anchor with robbers were lightly armed, often with knives. 
Robbers often flee out of scene without being spotted and attack crew. 
However, violent attack causing crew seriously injured also occurred. In 
this region ReCAAP was signed in 2004 as a mechanism to quickly 
organize assistance when vessel under attack. ReCAAP was issued after 
the accident occurred in Malacca Strait. Indonesia and Malaysia are the 
only two ASEAN states that remain outside ReCAAP. Indonesia’s reason 
regarding the agreement stem primarily comes from concerns that it 
would undermine the country’s sovereignty. This results Indonesia is 
limiting their cooperation with ReCAAP to sharing information with the 
Ship type 
Total 
number Ship type 
Total 
number 
Bulk carrier 1425 Gas tanker 169 
Tanker 1228 Reefer 95 
General cargo 
ship 949 Ro-Ro 75 
Container ship 933 Car carrier 38 
Chemical 
tanker 580 Passenger ship 21 
Special 
purpose 406 Ferry 13 
Small craft 381 Barge 49 
unspecified 275   









Figure 2. 1Comparison maritime piracy and robbery incidents in the waters 
and ports of Indonesia, Malaysia, Southeast Asia, and Asia as a whole, 2009–
2012 
 Based on graphic shown it can be confirmed that there is a rising 
number trend of robbery and theft incident in Southeast Asia. Despite 
geographically limited multilateral initiatives, both Indonesia and 
Malaysia prefer to view the piracy problem as a domestic issue that best 
be addressed by strengthening its law enforcement agencies and navy, 
as well as by addressing some of the underlying causes of piracy, such as 
poverty and a lack of economic opportunities.  
  
2.3 Indonesia’s Maritime Piracy  
Indonesia has the highest piracy crimes rate compared to other 
countries in Southeast Asia and the 2nd in the world based on annual 
report of Piracy and Armed Robbery Against Ships published by ICC 
International Maritime Bureau in 2018. According to a 2017 report by the 











2009 2010 2011 2012
Malaysia Indonesia Southeast Asia Asia (total)
 2009 2010 2011 2012 
Malaysia  15 18 17 12 
Indonesia 19 47 49 71 
Southeast Asia 72 120 128 111 
Asia (total) 102 167 157 132 





was higher than in other piracy-prone areas in the seas off West and East 
Africa. 43 violent in the sea were reported. These include one hijacking, 
five attempted attacks and 33 incidents at berth or at anchor, when ships 
were not underway. Based on the report, Indonesia was the most piracy-
prone country in the world from 2012. Between 2000 and 2014 the 
average number of piracy events each year within Indonesia waters is 100, 
it is one of the highest totals of any country in the Asia-Pacific region 
(Morris & Paoli, 2018). 
Indonesian-style piracy is closer to sea-thieves. The act is carried out 
on the high seas, while these armed robberies occur in territorial waters. 
Sea-robbers usually steal salaries in cash, mobile phones, laptops and 
shipping equipment (Frécon, 2018). Based on Frécon research in 2000-
2010 about how the piracy act in Indonesia works, he found that there 
were two different types of categories. The first category consists of local 
taxi-boat drivers and fishermen who know the area well. They usually hid 
themselves in mangroves along straits and steal valuables from boats 
passing close to the shores. This category usually are amateurs who strike 
at night and put on masks and use their own household machetes 
(parang). They are led by either a violent or generous chief, one of whom 
considered himself a sea Robin Hood who provided funds to build a 
village and a mosque.  
The second category consists of young people from remote 
Indonesian islands who are struggling to find proper jobs. This group 
works when they have job order from a foreign bad-intentioned 
businessperson to hijack a ship. The ship crew are either taken hostage 
or left at sea on a lifeboat during their operation. Once on board, they 
take over to sell the cargo. 
To provide more about the recent statistics and characteristics from 
piracy and robbery attack in Indonesia, several tables are presented in 
this chapter. This tables are obtained from the recent International 
Maritime Bureau report of 2018.  
 
Table 2. 2 Actual and Attempted attack in Southeast Asia 
 
  Actual attacks Attempted attacks 
Location Boarded Hijacked Attempted Fired Upon 
SE ASIA          Indonesia 19   6   
Malaysia 1   1   





Table 2.2 show the number of actual and attempted attacks happened 
in the South East Asia region during the first semester of 2018. This table 
give a clear comparation between number of events happening in 
Indonesia, Malaysia, and Philippines. From this table known that the 
attacks in South East Asia region only happened in these three countries. 
Without adding up the number of actual and attempted attacks, it is 
clearly shown that Indonesia in this year leads as the country with highest 
number of piracy and robbery attacks in South East Asia region.  
 
Table 2. 3 Port and anchorage with three or more reported incidents 
 
Table 2.3 present a more precise comparation of attacks of the 
countries with leading the number of attacks worldwide. Two of the most 
attacks in Indonesia take place on Muara Berau and Pulau Bintan. 11 
attacks happened in Muara Berau make the location 2nd prone area of 
piracy and robbery attack.   
 
Table 2. 4 Ship status during actual attacks January - June 2018 
Location Anchored Berth Steaming Not Stated 
SE ASIA  Indonesia 10   3   
Malaysia     1   
Philippines         
 
10 out of 13 the actual attacks in Indonesia are happened while the 
ships anchored at the port shown by Table 2.4.  While 3 of them are 
happened while ships steaming. The reason might of the attack 
happened during ships anchoring is due to the mobilization of the ship 
is limited, and most of the crew are not on guard.  
Country Location January – June 2018 
Bangladesh Chittangong / Kutubdia 7 
Benin Cotonou 5 
Ghana Takoradi 4 
Haiti Port Au Prince 3 
Indonesia Muara Berau 11 
Indonesia Pulau Bintan 3 
Nigeria Lagos 14 
Peru Callao 3 
Venezuela Puerto Jose 4 





Table 2. 5 Ship status during attempted attacks January - June 2018 
Location Anchored Berthed Steaming 
SE ASIA       Indonesia 6     
Malaysia     1 
Philippines     2 
 
Table 2.5 shows that even most of the attempted attack in Indonesia 
operated while ships are anchored and there is no attempted attack 
happened during steaming. Meanwhile in Malaysia and Philippines 
attempted attack happened during steaming. For the attempted attacks, 
the status of the ship in Indonesia, Malaysia, and Philippines are different. 
 
Table 2. 6 Violence type to crew January - June 2018 
Location Hostage Kidnap Threatened Injured 
SE ASIA     Indonesia 1   2   
 
The types of violence the robbers usually done to the crew in Indonesia 
are presented in Table 2.6. From the table we can assume that the robbers 
are likely armed. They also do take hostages of the crew and asked for 
cash in return to release the crew.   
 
Table 2. 7 Armed used January - June 2018 
 
Types of armed used to attack by the robbers mainly are not stated in 
the report. But, from the table information obtained are that the robbers 
are most likely arm themselves before doing the action and use the arm 
when they only need it.  
 
From all tables attached, it provides a verification of research done by 
Frécon about the characteristics of piracy and robber attack in Indonesia. 
As an additional information regarding the characteristics of piracy and 
robbery attacks in Indonesia, a note cited from International Maritime 
Bureau Report stated that the robbers are normally armed with guns or 
Location Guns Knives Not stated 
Other 
Weapons 
SE ASIA    Indonesia   4 21   
Malaysia    1 1   





knives or machetes. And there is still many of attacks that have gone 
unreported. Pirates or robbers normally attack vessel during the night. 
When spotted and alarm sounded, they usually escape without 
confronting the crew.  
 
2.4 Port Tanjung Perak 
Due to geographic characteristics where most of the territory is in the 
form of the sea, sea transportation has become a dominant and 
important tool to facilitate inter-island relations throughout Indonesia. 
The means of sea transportation also affect the social relations and 
distribution channels for Indonesia’s international trade. To support this, 
ports are needed as a gateway to support the economic growth. Port has 
undergone development in accordance with human needs and time. Port 
nowadays has various functions, namely as a passenger port, as an access 
point for inter-island trade routes (domestic) and foreign trade 
(international) and other economic activities. Indonesia currently has 5 
main trade support ports. One of them is Port of Tanjung Perak.  
 
Port of Tanjung Perak is the second largest and busiest port in 
Indonesia after the port of Tanjung Priok, Jakarta. This is because, in 
addition to being a gateway for eastern Indonesia, it is also due to 
increasing economic growth in the East Java Province. The situation 
affected the increasing flow of goods distribution to and from the East 





Java region both for domestic goods and international trade. Domestic 
and international goods distribution activities continue to increase from 
year to year. Due to its criticality, the security and safety of this port is a 
critical concern for Indonesia’s economic growth. Therefore, this port is 
chosen to be assessed in this research study.  
Port of Tanjung Perak has varied depth depend on TEUs of ships; 14 
metres depth to serve 10,000 TEUs 5th generation ships to be finished in 
mid-2015, while 16 metres (52 ft) depth with width 200 metres (660 ft) 
can serve 15,000 TEUs or 7th generation ships to be finished in mid-2016. 
Tanjung Perak has 6 main terminals, multi-purpose terminals for 
conventional cargo handling, passenger terminal, RoRo and an 
international container terminal. In 2015 port activities in Tanjung Perak 
are supported by Teluk Lamong Port Terminal, which is one of the most 
sophisticated port terminals in the world with fully automated operating 
system. Due to one of its function serving international voyage, 10 of its 
terminals including TUKS implement ISPS Code. Belows are the 
information regarding International Ship and Port Facility Security (ISPS) 
Code of the three terminals in Port of Tanjung Perak that already comply 
with the code.  
 
Facility Details 
Port facility name Terminal Jamrud  
IMO Port facility 
number IDSUB-0011 
Alternative names 
for this port facility, 
if applicable  
Port facility 
description General cargo, container, tanker, Ro-ro 
Latitude 1° 11.49` S 
Longitude 112° 43.25` E 
Security Plan 
Port facility has alternative security agreements No 
Port facility has approved equivalent security 
arrangements No 
Port facility has approved port facility security plan 
(PFSP) Yes 





Date of most recent review or approval of the port 
facility security plan (PFSP)  13/07/14 
Date of most recently issued Statement of 
Compliance, if applicable 02/12/14 
Has this port facility security plan (PFSP) been 
withdrawn No 
Figure 2. 3 Port Facility Security of Jamrud Pelindo III  
Source: IMO GISIS 
 
Figure 2.3 issued the Port Facility Security of Terminal Jamrud in 
regards to International Ship and Port Facility Security (ISPS) Code. It is 
registered to International Maritime Organization as Port Facility that has 
already comply to International Ship and Port Facility Security (ISPS) 




Port facility name Terminal Petikemas Surabaya  
IMO Port facility 
number IDSUB-0015 
Alternative names for 
this port facility, if 
applicable  
Port facility 
description Container terminal 
Latitude 7° 11.44` S 
Longitude 112° 42.05` E 
Security Plan 
Port facility has alternative security agreements No 
Port facility has approved equivalent securit 
arrangements No 
Port facility has approved port facility security plan 
(PFSP) Yes 
Date of port facility security plan (PFSP) approval 21/10/04 
Date of most recent review or approval of the port 




Date of most recently issued Statement of Compliance, if 
applicable 27/10/14 
Has this port facility security plan (PFSP) been withdrawn No 
Figure 2. 4 Port Facility Security of Terminal Petikemas Surabaya 
Source: IMO GISIS 
 
Figure 2.4 issued the Port Facility Security Note of Terminal Petikemas 
Surabaya in regards to International Ship and Port Facility Security (ISPS) 
Code. It is registered to International Maritime Organization as Port 
Facility that has already comply to International Ship and Port Facility 
Security (ISPS) Code. Terminal Petikemas Surabaya only Container. 
  
Facility Details 
Port facility name Terminal Teluk Lamong 
IMO Port facility 
number IDSUB-0018 
Alternative names 
for this port facility, 
if applicable  
Port facility 
description Multi-Purpose Terminal 
Latitude 7° 12.00` S 
Longitude 112° 40.00` E 
Security Plan 
Port facility has alternative security agreements No 
Port facility has approved equivalent securit 
arrangements No 
Port facility has approved port facility security plan 
(PFSP) Yes 
Date of port facility security plan (PFSP) approval 01/04/15 
Date of most recent review or approval of the port 
facility security plan (PFSP)  01/04/15 
Date of most recently issued Statement of 
Compliance, if applicable 25/07/18 






Figure 2. 5 Port Facility Security Terminal Teluk Lamong 
Source: IMO GISIS 
 
Figure 2.5 issued Port Facility Security Note of Terminal Teluk Lamong 
in regards to International Ship and Port Facility Security (ISPS) Code. It is 
registered to International Maritime Organization as Port Facility that has 
already comply to International Ship and Port Facility Security (ISPS) 
Code. Terminal Teluk Lamong serves as a multi-purpose terminal. This 
terminal is the most recent terminal built. The operation in this terminal 
started at 2015 and is the first green port in Indonesia. These three 
terminals will be assessed and selected in this research study. The rest of 
the terminals mentioned below will not be assessed in this study.  
 
Facility Details 
Port facility name Berlian Jasa Terminal Indonesia 
IMO Port facility number IDSUB-0008 
Port facility description General cargo, container, tanker 
Latitude 7° 12.10` S 
Longitude 112° 43.32` E 
Security Plan 
Port facility has alternative security agreements No 
Port facility has approved equivalent securit arrangements No 
Port facility has approved port facility security plan (PFSP) Yes 
Date of port facility security plan (PFSP) approval 11/06/04 
Date of most recent review or approval of the port facility 
security plan (PFSP)  14/10/14 
Date of most recently issued Statement of Compliance, if 
applicable 20/11/14 
Has this port facility security plan (PFSP) been withdrawn No 
Figure 2. 6 Port Facility Security Berlian Jas Terminal Indonesia 
Source: IMO GISIS 
 
Figure 2.6 issued the Port Facility Security Note of Berlian Jasa Terminal 
Indonesia (BJTI) in regards to International Ship and Port Facility Security 
(ISPS) Code. It is registered to International Maritime Organization as Port 
Facility that has already comply to International Ship and Port Facility 
Security (ISPS) Code. Berlian Jasa Terminal Indonesia (BJTI) were used to 






Port facility name Dermaga Terminal Nilam Utara Bag. Barat 
IMO Port facility number IDSUB-0029 
Port facility description Bulk Liquid Cargo 
Latitude 7° 11.00` S 
Longitude 112° 42.00` E 
Security Plan 
Port facility has alternative security agreements No 
Port facility has approved equivalent securit arrangements No 
Port facility has approved port facility security plan (PFSP) Yes 
Date of port facility security plan (PFSP) approval 21/12/17 
Date of most recent review or approval of the port facility 
security plan (PFSP)   
Date of most recently issued Statement of Compliance, if 
applicable 05/03/18 
Has this port facility security plan (PFSP) been withdrawn No 
Figure 2. 7 Port Facility Security Terminal Nilam Utara Barat 
Source: IMO GISIS 
 
Figure 2.7 issued the Port Facility Security Note of Dermaga Terminal 
Nilam Utara Bagian Barat in regards to International Ship and Port Facility 
Security (ISPS) Code. It is registered to International Maritime 
Organization as Port Facility that has already comply to International Ship 
and Port Facility Security (ISPS) Code. Dermaga Terminal Nilam Utara 





Port facility name Semampir – PT. Pertamina (Persero) 
IMO Port facility number IDSUB-0028 
Port facility description Unloading Avtur, Kerosene, Solar and Ido 
Latitude 7° 11.38` S 






Port facility has alternative security agreements No 
Port facility has approved equivalent securit arrangements No 
Port facility has approved port facility security plan (PFSP) Yes 
Date of port facility security plan (PFSP) approval 15/06/04 
Date of most recent review or approval of the port facility 
security plan (PFSP)  09/06/14 
Date of most recently issued Statement of Compliance, if 
applicable 03/09/14 
Has this port facility security plan (PFSP) been withdrawn No 
Figure 2. 8 Port Facility Security Terminal Semampir PT. Pertamina  
Source: IMO GISIS 
Figure 2.8 issued the Port Facility Security Note of Terminal Semampir 
of PT. Pertamina (Persero) in regards to International Ship and Port 
Facility Security (ISPS) Code. It is registered to International Maritime 
Organization as Port Facility that has already comply to International Ship 
and Port Facility Security (ISPS) Code. Terminal Semampir of PT. 
Pertamina (Persero) were used to facilitate unloading avtur, kerosene, 
solar and ido. 
 
Facility Details 
Port facility name PT. AKR Corporindo Tbk. 
IMO Port facility number IDSUB-0014 
Port facility description Bulk, Liquid 
Latitude 7° 11.58` S 
Longitude 112° 43.10` E 
Security Plan 
Port facility has alternative security agreements No 
Port facility has approved equivalent securit arrangements No 
Port facility has approved port facility security plan (PFSP) Yes 
Date of port facility security plan (PFSP) approval 14/06/04 
Date of most recent review or approval of the port facility 
security plan (PFSP)   
Date of most recently issued Statement of Compliance, if 
applicable 21/10/14 
Has this port facility security plan (PFSP) been withdrawn No 
Figure 2. 9 Port Facility Security PT. AKR Corporindo Tbk 




Figure 2.9 issued the Port Facility Security Note of PT. AKR Corporindo 
Tbk in regards to International Ship and Port Facility Security (ISPS) Code. 
It is registered to International Maritime Organization as Port Facility that 
has already comply to International Ship and Port Facility Security (ISPS) 
Code. PT. AKR Corporindo Tbk. were used to facilitate bulk and liquid. 
 
Facility Details 
Port facility name PT. ISM Bogasari Flour Mills 
IMO Port facility number IDSUB-0010 
Port facility description Bulk 
Latitude 7° 12.07` S 
Longitude 112° 43.19` E 
Security Plan 
Port facility has alternative security agreements No 
Port facility has approved equivalent securit arrangements No 
Port facility has approved port facility security plan (PFSP) Yes 
Date of port facility security plan (PFSP) approval 11/06/04 
Date of most recent review or approval of the port facility 
security plan (PFSP)  14/11/16 
Date of most recently issued Statement of Compliance, if 
applicable 13/11/14 
Has this port facility security plan (PFSP) been withdrawn No 
Figure 2. 10 Port Facility Security Terminal Teluk Lamong 
Source: IMO GISIS 
Figure 2.10 issued the Port Facility Security Note of PT. ISM Bogasari 
Flour Mills in regards to International Ship and Port Facility Security (ISPS) 
Code. It is registered to International Maritime Organization as Port 
Facility that has already comply to International Ship and Port Facility 
Security (ISPS) Code. PT. ISM Bogasari Flour Mills were used to facilitate 
bulk. 
 
2.5 Engineering Statistics 
A common attitude among engineers are to consider statistics as a 
tool in their toolbox. It can be of great help in a number of cases and 
having a general idea of how it works and use it whenever the problem 
under study requires it. One of the basic and fundamental theory known 





concept pervade many aspects of human activities. Probability is a loosely 
defined term employed in everyday conversation to indicate the measure 
of one’s belief in the occurrence of a future event when this event may or 
may not occur.  
Probabilities near 1 indicate that the event is extremely likely to occur, 
probabilities near 0 indicate that the event is almost not likely to occur 
and probabilities near 0.5 indicate a fair chance, that the event is just as 
likely to occur as not. In the context of system engineering, these two 
absolute conditions are a failed system and a successful system (Artana 
& Dinariyana, 2013). In this context the chances of success and failure can 
be interpreted as follows: 
  
𝑃(𝑠𝑢𝑐𝑐𝑒𝑠𝑠) =
𝑛𝑢𝑚𝑏𝑒𝑟 𝑜𝑓 𝑠𝑢𝑐𝑐𝑒𝑠𝑠𝑓𝑢𝑙 𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑠
𝑡ℎ𝑒 𝑛𝑢𝑚𝑏𝑒𝑟 𝑜𝑓 𝑎𝑙𝑙 𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑏𝑙𝑒 𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑠
   2. 1 
 
𝑃(𝑓𝑎𝑖𝑙𝑢𝑟𝑒 ) =
𝑛𝑢𝑚𝑏𝑒𝑟 𝑜𝑓 𝑓𝑎𝑖𝑙𝑒𝑑 𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑠
𝑡ℎ𝑒 𝑛𝑢𝑚𝑏𝑒𝑟 𝑜𝑓 𝑎𝑙𝑙 𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑏𝑙𝑒 𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑠
  2. 2 
 
If, 
s = number of successful events 
f  = number of failed events 
 









      2. 4 
2.5.1. Venn Diagram 
An understanding of some rules for combining opportunities will be 
made easier with the help of the Venn agency. Venn diagrams are 
generally represented by a rectangle that represents the total 
opportunities available. There are two or more events in which the 
opportunities for each event will be combined. 




Source: Theory of system reliability and its application the first edition 
 
2.5.1.1. Independent Events 
If the occurrence of event B has no effect on the probability of event 
A, then A and B are said to be independent and we can express this fact 
in terms of conditional probability as  
 
𝑃(𝐴|𝐵) = 𝑃(𝐴)     2. 5 
 
or, equivalently, since we expect symmetry (if A is independent of B 
then B is independent of A) 
 
𝑃(𝐵|𝐴) = 𝑃(𝐵)     2. 6 
 
2.5.1.2. Conditional Events 
Conditional events are events that occur if another event has occurred. 
Opportunity for occurrence A occurs if event B has already occurred 
written with P (A | B) read event A if B, or opportunity with the condition 
A if B has occurred. 
 
𝑃(𝐴|𝐵) =
𝑡ℎ𝑒 𝑛𝑢𝑚𝑏𝑒𝑟 𝑜𝑓 𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑠 𝐴 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝐵 𝑐𝑎𝑛 𝑜𝑐𝑐𝑢𝑟 𝑡𝑜𝑔𝑒𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑟
𝑡ℎ𝑒 𝑛𝑢𝑚𝑏𝑒𝑟 𝑜𝑓 𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑛𝑡 𝐵 𝑜𝑐𝑐𝑢𝑟 







     2. 8 
 
2.5.2. Bayes Theorem 
The concept of conditional probability is presented in this chapter on 
equation 2.8 . It is noted that the conditional probability of an event is a 
probability obtained with the additional information that some other 







    2. 9 
 
Conditional probability in Bayes theorem used for revising a 
probability value based on additional information that is later obtained. 
One key to understanding the essence of Bayes theorem is to recognize 





information is obtained for a subsequent event. Terms prior probability 
and posterior probability are commonly used in Bayes Theorem. A prior 
probability is an initial probability value originally obtained before any 
additional information is obtained. A posterior probability is a probability 
value that has been revised by using additional information that is later 
obtained.  
 
2.6 Bayesian Network 
Bayesian networks (BN) also known as belief networks is one of 
probabilistic graphical models (GM). Bayesian networks (BN) are 
graphical models for reasoning under uncertainty, where the nodes 
represent variables (discrete or continuous) and arcs represent direct 
connections between them. These direct connections are often causal 
connections. Bayesian Network (BN) model the quantitative strength of 
the connections between variables, allowing probabilistic beliefs about 
them to be updated automatically as new information becomes available. 
Nodes in Bayesian network represent a set of random variables, X = 
X1,..Xi,...Xn, from the domain. A set of directed arcs connects pairs of 
nodes, Xi → X j , represent direct dependencies between variables. 
Assuming discrete variables, the strength of the relationship between 
variables is quantified by conditional probability distributions associated 
with each node. The only constraint on the arcs allowed in a BN is that 
there must not be any directed cycles. Such networks are called directed 
acyclic graphs, or simply dags.  
Graphical structures in this method are used to represent knowledge 
about an uncertain domain. Bayesian networks consist of nodes. Each 
node in the graph represents random variable, while the edges between 
the nodes represent probabilistic dependencies among the 
corresponding random variables. These conditional dependencies in the 
graph are often estimated by using known statistical and computational 
methods. Hence, BNs combine principles from graph theory, probability 
theory, computer science, and statistics.  
Bayesian network modelling is used in this research due to its 
functionality fit for this case of which has multiple various variables 
contributes to success attacks of piracy and robbery. Those multiple 
variable relation to each other is also unknown (limited information), this 
characteristic is one of the reasons why Bayesian network is used due to 





2.6.1 Nodes and Value 
In this research study nodes that will be discussed is nodes that takes 
discrete values. The values should be both mutually exclusive and 
exhaustive, which means that the variable must take on exactly one of 
these values at a time. Common types of discrete nodes include:  
• Boolean nodes, which represent propositions, taking the binary 
values true(T) and false (F). In a medical diagnosis domain, the 
node Cancer would represent the proposition that a patient has 
cancer.  
• Ordered values. For example, a node Pollution might represent a 
patient’s pollution exposure and take the values {low, medium, 
high}.  
• Integral values. For example, a node called Age might represent a 





Figure 2. 12 Bayesian Network Structure 
Source: Introduction of Bayesian Network Book 
 
Structure or topology of Bayesian Network (BN) should capture 
qualitative relationships between variables (nodes). Nodes should be 
connected directly if one affects or causes the other, with the arc 
indicating the direction of the effect. It is useful to employ a family 





well known used in creating Bayesian Network (BN) structure. Parent 
node is a node where the arc are coming from towards the other node. 
Child nodes are the nodes of which the direction of the arc of parent 
nodes are headed. Extending the metaphor if there is a directed chain of 
nodes, one node is an ancestor of another if it appears earlier in the chain, 
whereas a node is a descendant of another node if it comes later in the 
chain. Any other terminology used is root node and leaf node. any node 
without parents is called a root node, while any node without children is 
called a leaf node. Any other node (non-leaf and non-root) is called an 
intermediate node. Given a causal understanding of the BN structure, this 
means that root nodes represent original causes, while leaf nodes rep- 
resent final effects.  
Figure 2.7 show an example of Bayesian Network (BN) structure. 
Cancer node has two parents, Pollution and Smoker, while Smoker is an 
ancestor of both X-ray and Dyspnoea. Similarly, X-ray is a child of Cancer 
and descendant of Smoker and Pollution. The set of parent nodes of a 
node X is given by Parents(X). Using the root and leaf terminology, for 
figure 2.7 Pollution and Smoker are root nodes, while the effects X-ray 
and Dyspnoea are leaf nodes  
 
2.6.3 Bayesian Network Reasoning 
How Bayesian Network (BN) reason with the domain after it is 
presented in a structure is a fundamental thing to do in creating Bayesian 
Network (BN) structure. When observing the value of some variable, it 
needs to be conditioned upon the new information. The process of 
conditioning also called probability propagation or inference or belief 
updating is performed via a flow of information through the network. 
Note that this information flow is not limited to the directions of the arcs. 
In our probabilistic system, this becomes the task of computing the 
posterior probability distribution for a set of query nodes, given values 
for some evidence or observation nodes. Bayesian networks provide full 
representations of probability distributions over their variables. That 
implies that they can be conditioned upon any subset of their variables, 
supporting any direction of reasoning. 
There are several types of reasoning of Bayesian Networks (BN) 
structure. For example, one can perform diagnostic reasoning from 
symptoms to cause, such as when a doctor observes Dyspnoea and then 
updates his belief about Cancer and whether the patient is a Smoker. Note 




The other type is predictive reasoning. This style of reasoning works 
from new information about causes to new beliefs about effects, 
following the directions of the network arcs. For example, the patient may 
tell his physician that he is a smoker; even before any symptoms have 
been assessed, the physician knows this will increase the chances of the 
patient having cancer. It will also change the physician’s expectations that 
the patient will exhibit other symptoms, such as shortness of breath or 
having a positive X-ray result.  
 
 
Figure 2. 13 Types of reasoning  
Source: Introduction of Bayesian Network Book 
 
2.7 Sensitivity Analysis  
Sensitivity Analysis is the study of how the uncertainty in the output of 
a model (numerical or otherwise) can be apportioned to different sources 
of uncertainty in the model input (Saltelli et al., 2004). Sensitivity Analysis 
is essentially a measure of how responsive the output of a model is to 
variations in the inputs. A model tested can be divided into 2 categories 






2.7.1 Entropy-based sensitivity analysis 
Entropy is a well-known function in the theory of information, which 
indicates the loss of information within a system then, by opposition, the 
amount of information. The entropy of a discrete random variable X 
ranging in x1,...,xn with respective probabilities p1,...,pn  
𝐻(𝑋) =  − ∑ 𝑝𝜅 ln(𝑝𝜅)𝑛𝑘=1      2.10 
 
Entropy is a term used in information technology and can be regarded 
as an indicator of how disordered a dataset is. Entropy is described as a 
value that, when increased, can be interpreted as increase in uncertainty 
of a dataset which would then require more information (Auder & Iooss, 
2009). Entropy stands for a global measure of influence, whereas variance 
only takes into account second-order moments, we can think entropy as 
a complement to the variance measure: entropy-based indices will more 











 A structured process in making this research is necessary in order to 
make the processed easier and more directed. In this chapter step by step 
of the preparation of the Novel Flexible Model for Piracy and Robbery 
Assessment for Port Tanjung Perak will be explained.   
 





3.2 Study Literature 
 Study literature in this research aims to prepare the author to 
understand the theory and explore all other supporting information 
related to this research. It will help the author to understand the problem 
and able to create a systematic identification of what factors can leads to 
successful piracy and robbery attack of which it will be set in scenarios. 
 
3.3 Data Collecting 
 The next step is data collecting. Data will be collected from field 
observation in Port Tanjung Perak includes factors influencing the 
occurrence likelihood of successful hijacking of a ship obtained from 
consultation and questionnaire from experts on piracy/robbery threats 
(Experts in this study will be ship’s captain and port manager), data 
statistic of ships and piracy attack in Port Tanjung Perak, piracy attack 
characteristics, etc.  
 
3.4 Determine Variables 
 After data gathered, data will be analysed and processed. All the data 
will be analyze to determine relationships on which the initial “cause and 
effect” diagram could be based. Later this data (variables) will be 
compiled to form scenarios (network scenario) in the next step. 
 
3.5 Model Development 
 After relationship of each data determined network structure 
(scenarios) will be created based on data collected. Quantification from 
expert opinions will be weighted to make conditional probability table.  
 
3.6 Model Testing / Validation 
 After Bayesian network structure with each probability is determined, 
sensitivity analysis will be used to provide a degree of confidence that the 
model has been built correctly and is working as intended using NETICA 
Software.  
 
3.7 Interpretation of Result 
 After model created is working, the simulation results are analysed to 
determine the best scenario that leads to successful attacks. From this 
scenario, improvements can be addressed more effectively to reduce 





3.8 Conclusion and Suggestion 
 Conclusion in this research will later answer the problem formulation 
and is a point to find out whether or not the objective of this final project 
is achieved. The advice given later is a proposal to improve the existing 
security protection (recommendation) and will be used as a suggestion 
for further research to correct errors, weaknesses, and shortcomings in 






















































ANALYSIS AND DISCUSSION 
 
4.1. General Description 
Security Assessment in this research will be done by using Bayesian 
network to analyse which variable leads to the success of piracy and 
robbery attack in a port. The port assessed in this research is Port Tanjung 
Perak, Surabaya. This chapter will discuss in detail steps of creating 
security assessment, starting with determining data required, hypothesis 
of variables using fishbone diagram based on literature study, data 
collecting, data processing, creating Bayesian network model, model 
testing or validation, and recommendation for the accident based on 
simulation result of the model. An illustration of steps in creating 
Bayesian Network in this study is shown in figure  
 
 
Figure 4. 1 Steps in Creating Bayesian Network 
 
4.2. Hypothesis of Variables causing Piracy and Robbery  
Before conducting the data collecting, study literature is done to 
provide knowledge and degree of confidence of the piracy and robbery 
characteristics. Study literature also give the writer an insight of data that 
must be collected to create Bayesian network. In this step, a hypothesis 
is made based on paper, journals, and books published discussing piracy 
and robbery attacks review. An assumption or a hypothesis is done to 
ease the data collecting process due to limited amount of time available 
for research. This hypothesis later will be verified in based on data 





fishbone diagram. Fishbone diagram which also known as cause and 
effect diagram is one of methods to identifies potential causes according 
to the level of importance of a problem or an effect. The causes is 
categorized by groups. It enables brainstorming process to creates and 
covers all the potential causes in a structured diagram. A fishbone 
diagram consists of: 
• Head of fish that represent the effect or the outcome 
• 1st level of Horizontal branches that represent main causes 
• Sub-branches that represent secondary causes or reasons of 
the 1st horizontal branches. 
• 2nd level of Horizontal branches that represent the reasons or 
the cause for sub-branches. 
Based on study literature done, a hypothesis of variables causing 
piracy and robbery attack in fishbone diagram is represented in Figure 
4.1  
Figure 4. 2 Fishbone Diagram of Piracy and Robbery Attack 
 
4.3. Data 
Data collected will be used as a verification for the hypothesis of 
potential causes made and as an input to create Bayesian network for 
security assessment of a port, in this case Tanjung Perak Port. The data 
needed are as follow: 




Number of attacks happen in the assessed port will be used to 
create probability of attack of piracy and robbery in Bayesian 
network. Figure 4.3 shows number of reported piracy and robbery 
attack in Port Tanjung Perak in the recent 5 years period based on 
data collected from Pelindo III, Harbour Master, and Polair Tanjung 
Perak.  
 
2. Chronology of the attack 
Chronology of piracy and robbery attack report will be used as a 
verification of hypothesis made and also to create Bayesian 
Network of piracy and robbery attack. Variables or causes of the 
attack will be listed based on chronology reports. Chronology of 
the attack is collected from Polair, Harbour Master, and Pelindo III. 
Table 4.1 present an example of chronology of the piracy and 
robbery attack in the recent 5 years period. A more detail 
chronology report of attack will be presented in attachment 
 
Table 4. 1 Example of Chronology of attack obtained 
2013 







11 The perpetrators of theft at the 
Port of Tanjung Perak, Surabaya, East 
Java were arrested. In each action, 
these perpetrators use trucks to 
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Robbery Attack Reported in Port of Tj. 
Perak






4.4. Data Analysis 
4.4.1. Factor Analysis 
After all of the data gathered, an analysis will be done to verified 
hypothesis that has been done. Based on a thorough analysis of the 
report of attack chronology, factors influencing the occurrence likelihood 
of successful attack of piracy and robbery in the area of Port of Tanjung 
Perak are identified. Codes will be used to ease identification of factors 
influencing the attack on the gathered report. This code is provided 
based on the hypothesis made from fishbone diagram.  
 




















Situation G1 Guarded 
carried on the boat. the crime mode 
carried out by the perpetrators, 
during the day the suspects 
conducted a survey first in the target 
location. After getting the target, the 
perpetrator took the sack to transport 
the stolen goods. 
"In the evening, the perpetrators took 
the items they were targeting, then 
transported them in L 8090 WJ trucks, 







Each one of this factor will be explained and categorized into 3 major 
categories based on its influence and relation with one another. This 
categorization will ease the process and enable a structured process to 
create Bayesian Network.  
 
4.4.1.1. Economical Value 
Most of the robbery attack in Port of Tanjung Perak in terms of 
economic value occurs either due to the economic value of cargo carried 
by the ship or the economic value of ship equipment. This two things are 
the most targeted by robbers based on the chronology report. According 
to the results of interviews with several parties who have handled theft 
cases, the stolen goods will be resold. Therefore, the target of theft is 
usually goods that have a high selling value and are easy to resell.  
 
4.4.1.2. Position 
Position referred to in this research is the position of the ship when 
the attack occurs. Based on the report gathered and used in this research, 
most of the attack happen is classified into 2 categories. The first one is 
when the ship is berthing or anchoring at the port. During this position, 
the robbers do not need an extra transportation such as boat to 
accommodate the robbers to the crime location. They usually pass the 
guard by camouflage themselves as TKBM. The number of piracy and 
robbery attack happen during berthing or anchoring is higher than the 
second category. The second categories is when the ship is in sailing 
condition. The robbers usually used a fast boat to accommodate them to 
the targeted ship. And then they will climb the hull of the ship and 
sneaked themselves to the targeted object.  
 
4.4.1.3. Part of a Day 
The time of piracy and robbery attacks in Port of Tanjung Perak follow 
a pattern according to the obtained reports. Generally speaking, there 
were more incidents during the day time than the ones in the night time. 
This reason could be due to the visibility in this hour is better than night 
time. Also, the humidity level during this hour is low which will impact the 
on-duty guard to lower their vigilance due to inconveniences of the 








The weather condition in this studied region varies from Clear to 
Thunderstorm. Weather data condition is gathered from 
Accuweather.com based on the chronology of the attack. Based on the 
varied weather, it then classified into 3 major categories. The first 
categories are poor. This category of weather condition consists of 
thunderstorm, light rain overcast. The second category is moderate. This 
category of weather condition consists of passing cloud and overcast. 
And the last category is good. This category of weather condition consists 
of partly sunny, scattered cloud and clear. Most of the attack in this region 
is happen during good weather condition. The humidity level of most 
attack ranges from 58 to 87 and the velocity of the wind obtained from 
barometer report range from 1008 to 1013.   
 
4.4.1.5. Defence 
Defence in this research refer to the lack of defence in the studied 
region. Lack of defence divided into 2 categories namely lack defence of 
personnel and lack defence of security equipment. This category is 
provided refers to the International Ship and Port Facility Security (ISPS) 
Code requirements. Based on analysis it was found that lack defence of 
security equipment influence the likelihood of attack the most. Based on 
interview, it is because most of the robber sneaked their way in the 
location where it is not possible for personnel stand guard. Also, from the 
robber perspectives they consider that if there is no security equipment 
then it will leave the action to be well execute because there will be no 
records of their crime. They consider the security equipment as an alarm 
for the guard.  
 
4.4.1.6. Capability 
Capability of the guard is also one of the main requirements of 
International Ship and Port Facility Security (ISPS) Code. Therefore, an 
analysis of the condition of this factor and its relation to the attack is an 
important factor. An analysis of this factors is based on the report 
provided from Harbour Master of Port of Tanjung Perak. Based on 
analysis the capability is divided into 2 categories namely trained and 
untrained. And most of the attack happened if the capability of the guard 
is untrained. The parameter of this variable is affected by the number of 






The situation in this study refer to weather the environment is guarded 
or unguarded. This category is based on the compliance of the port 
facility from the assessment done by Harbour Master of Port of Tanjung 
Perak. Guarded is the condition when the port facility situation is 
compliance to the International Ship and Port Facility Security (ISPS) Code 
standards. Due to the compliance of the port facility to the International 
Ship and Port Facility Security (ISPS), the port is categorized as guarded 
because there are numbers of security requirements needs to be fulfilled 
to get a good grade of International Ship and Port Facility Security (ISPS) 
Code. And for the unguarded situation corelates with the non-
compliance found by Harbour Master during assessment in regards to 
International Ship and Port Facility Security (ISPS) Code. Based on analysis 
from Harbour Master report, we found that majority of the facility in the 
Port of Tanjung Perak has already comply to International Ship and Port 
Facility Security (ISPS) Code. But there is still numbers of non-compliance 
found regarding International Ship and Port Facility Security (ISPS) Code.  
 
4.4.1.8. Compliance 
The compliance in this research refers to the compliance of the ship 
entering the port facility. In this research, the correlations of the ship 
compliance to the robbery attack is analysed based on the report 
gathered from Harbour Master Tanjung Perak. Based on the report, 90% 
of the ship entering Port of Tanjung Perak is incompliance with the 
International Ship and Port Facility Security (ISPS) Code. An example case 
of analysis using this code is shown on table 4.3. 
 
Table 4. 3 An Example of Chronology Report Analysis using code developed 
2013 








11 The perpetrators of theft at 
the Port of Tanjung Perak, 
Surabaya, East Java were 
arrested. In each action, these 
perpetrators use trucks to 
transport stolen goods that 












crime mode carried out by the 
perpetrators, during the day 
the suspects conducted a 
survey first in the target 
location. After getting the 
target, the perpetrator took 
the sack to transport the 
stolen goods. 
"In the evening, the 
perpetrators took the items 
they were targeting, then 
transported them in L 8090 
WJ trucks, and then sold them 
on Jalan Tambak Mayor. G1 
 
Table 4.3 present an example of chronology report analysis using the 
code developed in this study. The characteristics of each case is analysed 
thoroughly using the code. From this coding system, the probability value 
of each code obtained. Later, this value will be processed to create 
Bayesian Network Model. The full table of chronology report analysis 
using code is attached. 
 
4.4.2. The Making of Probability Value  
Probability in general can be interpreted as a mathematical measure 
of the tendency for an event to occur. Mathematically the opportunity 
has a range of values from 0 to 1. The opportunity value 0 means that the 
occurrence of the event is very unlikely, and the opportunity value 1 
means that the event must have appeared. The opportunity value can 
also be between the two absolute values above, or in other words the 
opportunity value will appear between the expected results and 
unexpected results (Artana, 2013). In the context of this research study 
these two absolute conditions are attack and no attack. 
To create the probability value for states in each node mentioned 
above, code is created to analyse the report of the attack. The attached 
code on table 4.2 is used for each case. Then, the code is processed into 
a table. If each state in the same node are added up the total probability 
value is 1. An example of making probability value for each node will be 
explained briefly in this section. In creating the probability value for nodes 




statistics used are obtained from Pelindo and Polair. For capability and 
situation nodes the report and statistics used are obtained from Harbour 
Master. And for weather node the verification and analysis of the weather 
condition during the day of the attack is based on Accuweather’s website. 
Detailed table of probability value for each state is attached on 
attachment.  
 
4.4.2.1. Economical Value 
Economical value consists of 2 states which are cargo and ship’s 
equipment. The probability value of both of this category is obtained 
from an analysis report analysis. Based on the analysis, it was found that 
there are 9 accident out of 13 accident happens of the stolen goods is 
equipment of the ships. And there are 4 accident out of 13 accident 
happen of which the stolen goods is the cargo of the ship. The probability 




Using the same method as economical value, the probability value in 
this category for the anchoring and sailing condition of the ship based 
on the analysis respectively are 0.53846154 and 0.46153846.  
  
4.4.2.3. Part of a Day 
This category is divided into 2 states which are daylight and night time. 
Based on the analysis, number of attacks happening from 2013-2018 
during daylight period is 7. In total, there are 12 accidents of stated time 
period of the attack in the report. Therefore, the probability value of 
daylight is 0.58333333. For the night time, there are total bu5 accident 
out of 12 accident based on detail statement of the time of the attack 
during this hour. The probability value of night time is 0.41666667. To be 
noted that the total probability value of daylight and night time if we add 
up is 1.  
 
4.4.2.4. Weather 
Weather condition category consist of 3 states which are poor, 
moderate, and good. Based on the analysis most of the attack is 
happening during moderate weather condition, then it should be the 
probability value of this state is higher than the other two states. In total 





good there are 4 accident happens during this weather condition, and for 
the last state there are 2 accident happens during this weather condition. 
Probability value of each states good, moderate, and poor respectively 
are 0.38461538; 0.46153846; and 0.15384615.  With the total sum of this 
three states are 1.  
 
4.4.2.5. Defence 
Using the same method as the other category, the probability value of 
states in this category are 0.28571429 for the personnel and 0.71428571 
for the equipment.  
 
4.4.2.6. Capability 
For this category the making probability value is quite different from 
the other categories due to the report used to make this probability is 
obtained from Harbour Master. Based on the report, a statistical number 
is obtained and then analyse to fit with the aim of this study. In this 
category, the probability value of the states is the opposite of the statistic 
obtained. It is caused by the characteristic of the states. The more trained 
the security officer and the environment, the less probability value that 
the attack will happen. Probability value of the states trained and 
untrained are 0.32090909 and 0.67909091. 
 
4.4.2.7. Situation 
In this category the same method used in capability category is used 
to create probability value for the states. This category consists of 
guarded and unguarded states. Probability value for each state guarded 
and unguarded are 0.10209899 and 0.89790101 respectively.  
 
4.4.2.8. Compliance 
As stated earlier in this chapter, this category refers to the compliance 
of the ship entering port facility. Based on statistic report gathered from 
Harbour Master.  Number of ship incompliance with International Ship 
and Port Facility Security (ISPS) Code regulation for ship with 
international voyage is a lot more than the ship which are not 
incompliance with the regulation.  For the probability value of state in this 
category is using the same characteristics with the capability and situation 
category. Therefore, the value for states comply and non-comply are 





4.5. Arrangement of Category 
After all of the probability value of each states in every category is 
defined, the next step is grouping the categories into Bayesian Network 
node. For this study, all of the 8 categories mentioned in the previous 
chapter is defined as a parent node or the first level of Bayesian Network. 
All of the 8 parent nodes will be grouped into 3 categories for the next 
level of node for Bayesian Network in this study. In this second level the 
categories are Ship, Environment, and Security. Based on analysis the 
second level of node for Ship category consist of Economical Value, 
Compliance and Position. For category Weather and Part of a Day is 
grouped into Environment category. And for Security category consist of 
Defence, Capability and Situation.  
 













4.6. Conditional Probability Table 
After all the nodes are being grouped, the next step is creating 
conditional probability table for this node. There are several ways in 
creating Bayesian Network (BN) Conditional Probability Table (CPT). In 
this research study the equation used is The Weighted Sum Algorithm. 
This method of calculation is an equation derived from paper called 
Generating Conditional Probabilities for Bayesian Network: Easing the 
Knowledge Acquisition Problem (Das, 2004). This method is used due to 
the required Conditional Probability Table (CPT) required by software 
used in this research study (NETICA Software) are a simplified CPT.  
To start the calculation for Conditional Probability Table for the 2nd 
Level Nodes namely Ship, Environment, and Security each parent nodes 





be presented. In this chapter, the calculation of Conditional Probability 
Table for node Ship is used as an example.  
As stated in the previous paragraph, each parent nodes for 
Environmental nodes will weighted equally. Environmental node consists 
of 2 parent nodes Part of a Day, and Weather with the relative weights 
1/2 for each nodes. Based on the software used, it specifies the 
Conditional Probability Table is 5x2 configurations due to combination 
for states of each nodes shown in Table 4.5  
 
Table 4. 5 Environment CPT required by NETICA Software 
Environment Yes No 
Daylight Poor   
Daylight Moderate   
Daylight Good   
Nightime Poor   
Nightime Moderate   
Nightime Good   
 
After that continue the next step to added up the weighted nodes to 

















    4. 2 
 
𝑃(𝑌𝑒𝑠|𝐷𝑎𝑦𝑙𝑖𝑔ℎ𝑡, 𝑃𝑜𝑜𝑟) = 0.3685    4. 3 
 
Based on that process done for each combination, the conditional 
probability table for Environment node obtained. Table 4.6 present the 
calculation result.  
 
Table 4. 6 Calculation result for CPT of Environment node 
Environment Yes No 
Daylight Poor 0.36858974 0.63141026 
Daylight Moderate 0.5224359 0.4775641 
Daylight Good 0.48397436 0.51602564 




Night time Moderate 0.43910256 0.56089744 
Night time Good 0.40064103 0.59935897 
 
 Using the same methods, Conditional Probability Table (CPT) for 
Security and Ship Node were obtained. The result of Conditional 
Probability Table (CPT) calculation of Security and Ship node presented 
in Table 4.7 and Table 4.8 respectively. 
 
Table 4. 7 Calculation Result for CPT of Security node 
Security Yes No 
Personnel Trained Guarded 0.76375921 0.23624079 
Personnel Trained Unguarded 0.49849187 0.50150813 
Personnel Untrained Guarded 0.64436527 0.35563473 
Personnel Untrained Unguarded 0.37909793 0.62090207 
Equipment Trained Guarded 0.62090207 0.37909793 
Equipment Trained Unguarded 0.35563473 0.64436527 
Equipment Untrained Guarded 0.50150813 0.49849187 
Equipment Untrained Unguarded 0.23624079 0.76375921 
 
Table 4. 8 Calculation Result for CPT of Ship node 
Ship Yes No 
Equipment Anchoring Comply 0.42749779 0.57250221 
Equipment Anchoring Non Comply 0.72634836 0.27365164 
Equipment Sailing Comply 0.40185676 0.59814324 
Equipment Sailing Non Comply 0.70070734 0.29929266 
Cargo Anchoring Comply 0.29929266 0.70070734 
Cargo Anchoring Non Comply 0.59814324 0.40185676 
Cargo Sailing Comply 0.27365164 0.72634836 
Cargo Sailing Non Comply 0.57250221 0.42749779 
 
After all the result for Conditional Probability Table (CPT) for nodes 
Environment, Security, and Ship were obtained we proceed to the next 
step to insert the calculation result to the NETICA software. After inserting 
the calculation result then the average probability for each state of the 












High Risk 0.66 





Based on that value, using the same method the Conditional 
Probability Table (CPT) for Attack node can be done. And from the 
calculation, the result is presented in Table 4.10.  
 
Table 4. 10 Calculation Result for CPT of Attack nodes 
Attack Yes No 
Yes High Risk Poor 0.48366667 0.51633333 
Yes High Risk Favourable 0.51766667 0.48233333 
Yes Low Risk Poor 0.377 0.623 
Yes Low Risk Favourable 0.411 0.589 
No High Risk Poor 0.589 0.411 
No High Risk Favourable 0.623 0.377 
No Low Risk Poor 0.48233333 0.51766667 
No Low Risk Favourable 0.51633333 0.48366667 
 
4.7. Bayesian Network 
After all of the calculation for Conditional Probability Table (CPT) is 
done, the next step is to insert the calculation Conditional Probability 
Table (CPT) to the NETICA Software. And the result of Bayesian Network 
model is presented in Figure 4.3. After the model is finished, the next step 












































































4.8. Sensitivity Analysis 
Sensitivity Analysis is done to measure how responsive the model 
created to variations in the inputs (parent nodes). Software used to do 
Sensitivity Analysis for the Bayesian Network (BN) model that has been 
created is NETICA Software. Due to the use of this model is to study which 
variable that is more likely cause an attack, therefore node attack is tested 
using sensitivity to findings tools in NETICA Software. The result of 
sensitivity of findings of node attack is presented on Figure 4.5 
 
Sensitivity Analysis 







Lack Defence 1.34 
Economical Value 1.16 
Capability 1 
Weather 0.0921 
Part of a Day 0.0563 
Position 0.0545 
Figure 4. 5 Sensitivity Analysis of Node Attack 
Figure 4.5 present the result of sensitivity analysis for variable “Attack” 
using the term entropy reduction in percent. An increasing value of 
entropy indicates increasing uncertainty of dataset of which will require 
more direction in order to describe the data. For the result shown on 
Figure 4.5 the entropy reduction value of node Attack is 100% showing 
that the node is working properly as intended. Value of node Attack is 
100% “uncertain” as it is affected by the value of its parent nodes; Ship, 
Security, and Environment. Comparing the result value of sensitivity 
analysis of each parent nodes, node Ship has the highest value. It 
indicates that the node Attack is affected significantly by a slight changes 
of node Ship. For that reason, a Sensitivity Analysis using sensitivity of 




Ship and Environmental. The result is shown in Figure 4.6, Figure 4.7 and 
Figure 4.8   
 
Sensitivity Analysis 
Node Entropy Reduction (%) 
Ship 100 
Compliance 14.2 









Part of a Day 0 
Figure 4. 6 Sensitivity Analysis Node Ship 
Figure 4.6 present the result of sensitivity analysis for variable “Ship” 
using the term entropy reduction in percent. Node Ship was first analysed 
due to previous finding of Sensitivity Analysis for node Attack that it 
causes the highest changes to the value of node Attack. For the result 
shown on Figure 4.6 the entropy reduction value of node Ship is 100% 
showing that the node is working properly as intended. Value of node 
Ship is 100% “uncertain” as it is affected by the value of its parent nodes; 
Compliance, Economical Value, and Position. Comparing the result value 
of sensitivity analysis of each parent nodes, node Compliance has the 
highest value. It indicates that the node Ship is affected significantly by a 
slight changes of node Compliance.  
 
Sensitivity Analysis 













Economical Value 0 
Part of a Day 0 
Weather  0 
Environment 0 
Figure 4. 7 Sensitivity Analysis Node Security 
Sensitivity Analysis were also done to each parent nodes of node 
Attack to find which root nodes affect the analysed node the most so that 
recommendation can be proposed. For the third Sensitivity Analysis node 
Security was analysed using the same method as the previous analysis. 
Figure 4.7 present the result of sensitivity analysis for variable “Security” 
using the term entropy reduction in percent. The result in Figure 4.7 
shown the entropy reduction value of node Security is 100% showing that 
the node is working properly as intended. Value of node Security is 100% 
“uncertain” as it is affected by the value of its parent nodes; Situation, 
Defence, and Capability. Comparing the result value of sensitivity analysis 
of each parent nodes, node Situation has the highest value. It indicates 




Node Entropy Reduction (%) 
Environment 100 
Weather 8.17 













Figure 4. 8 Sensitivity Analysis Node Environment 
To provide a second statement of Sensitivity Analysis obtained from 
NETICA Software and discover which states in the root nodes cause a 
significant change to the child nodes, the author tried to change the value 
of each states for each nodes Attack, Ship, Security and Environment to 
the maximum percentage and compare the result before and after the 




  Indicates the states with the highest changing in the same node 
  Indicates the nodes with the highest sum up value of changing 
 





Parent Nodes PN States Before After 
100 
Security 
Yes 34.2 29.8 4.4 
No 65.8 70.2 4.4 
Ship 
High Risk 66 70.4 36.5 
Low Risk 34 29.5 9.4 
Environment 
Poor 44.9 43.4 11.7 
Favourable 55.1 56.6 1.5 
 
Table 4.11 present the comparation result by changing the value of 
“Yes” in node attack to its maximum of 100 from a scale 0-100. By 
changing the value of attack from 53.5 to 100 create changes for the value 
of its parent nodes; Security, Ship, and Environment. The before and after 
value due to maximizing “Yes” of the node attack is shown. Based on the 
result obtained, node Security both of the states had the same difference 
value, meaning that both of the states equally change the value of node 
Ship. For node Ship and Environment shown a different result. States High 
Risk of node Ship has higher difference value, meaning a slight change of 
its value affect node Ship significantly. The same situation occurs on the 
node Environment. States Poor shows higher difference value than 
Favourable, meaning that a slight change of its value affect node 





shade. This indicates that node Ship create a more significant change to 
the node Attack. It is found by comparing the total difference for each 
state in the same node to the other parent nodes. This experiment result 
provided a second statement that node Ship has the highest significant 
influence to node Attack.  
 






Parent Nodes PN States Before After 
100 
E. Value 
Equipment 69.2 73.4 4.2 
Cargo 30.8 26.6 4.2 
Position 
Anchoring 53.8 54.8 1 
Sailing 46.2 45.2 1 
Compliance 
Comply 5.17 2.95 2.22 
Non Comply 94.8 97 2.2 
 
Because the node Ship was found having the highest influence to node 
Attack, the same experiment that previously done to node Attack is also 
done to this node before the other parent node. Table 4.12 present the 
comparation result by changing the value of “High Risk” in node Ship to 
its maximum of 100 from a scale 0-100. By changing the value of High 
Risk from 66 to 100 create changes for the value of its parent nodes; 
Economical Value, Position, and Compliance. The before and after value 
due to maximizing “High Risk” of the node Ship is shown. Based on the 
result obtained, node Economical Value and Position each of their states 
in the same node has the same difference value, meaning that both of 
the states in each node change the value of node Ship equally. Node 
Compliance shown a different result. State Comply is found having a 
slights higher difference value, meaning if its value change it will affect 
node Compliance compared to Non-comply. Node Economical Value is 
highlighted with an orange shade that point out that node Economical 
Value create a more significant change to the node Ship. It is found by 
comparing the total difference for each state in the same node to the 
other parent nodes. This experiment result provided a second statement 











Parent Nodes PN States Before After 
100 
Situation 
Guarded 10.2 17.3 7.1 
Unguarded 89.8 82.7 7.1 
Capability 
Trained 32.1 39.7 7.6 
Untrained 67.9 60.3 7.6 
Defence 
Personnel 28.6 37.1 8.5 
Equipment 71.4 62.9 8.5 
 
Table 4.13 present the comparation result by changing the value of 
“Yes” in node Security to its maximum of 100 from a scale 0-100. By 
changing the value of “Yes” from 34.2 to 100 create changes for the value 
of its parent nodes; Situation, Capability, and Defence. The before and 
after value due to maximizing “Yes” of the node is shown. Based on the 
result obtained, all of the three parent nodes had the same difference 
value, meaning that both of the states in each node change the value of 
node Ship equally. Defence is highlighted with an orange shade that 
point out that node Defence create a more significant change to the node 
Ship. It is found by comparing the total difference for each state in the 
same node to the other parent nodes. This experiment result provided a 
second statement that node Defence has the highest significant influence 
to node Security. 
 





Parent Nodes PN States Before After 
100 
Part of a Day 
Daylight 58.3 58.7 0.4 
Nightime 41.7 45.3 3.6 
Weather 
Poor 15.4 18.6 3.2 
Moderate 46.2 42.9 3.3 
Good 38.5 38.5 0 
 
Table 4.14 present the comparation result by changing the value of 





100. By changing the value of Favourable from 55.1 to 100 create changes 
for the value of its parent nodes; Part of a Day and Weather. The before 
and after value due to maximizing “Favourable” of the node Environment 
is shown. Based on the result obtained, State Night time of node Part of 
a Day has higher difference value, meaning a slight change of its value 
affect node Environment significantly. As for node Weather the same 
situation occurs on. It was found that state Moderate has higher 
difference value, meaning a slight change of its value affect node Weather 
significantly. Weather is highlighted with an orange shade that point out 
that node Weather create a more significant change to the node 
Environment. It is found by comparing the total difference for each state 
in the same node to the other parent nodes. This experiment result 
provided a second statement that node Weather has the highest 
significant influence to node Environment. 
 
After all of the above test is done finding the range of changes of node 
Attack if the value of its parent nodes is varied is the next step which is 
important to serves a more thorough analysis. In order to analyse the 
effect, a state for each parent node of node Attack must be selected and 
the value of that states will be modified to 0, 25, 50, 75 and 100. The 
analysis result is presented in the form of table. The table 4.16 to 4.18 will 
present the result for nodes Ship, Security, and Environment respectively 
 
Table 4. 15 Range of Change by varying node Ship 
Ship 








Table 4.15 show the result of varying the value of states “High Risk” in 
node Ship creates an impact of 10.7% change. The results present that 
changing the node ship itself leads to a likelihood attack as low as 
approximate 46.5% up to maximum 57.2%. Compliance node mainly 
responsible for this impact as it is the parent node of node Ship. This 
finding is based on result presented in Figure 4.6. By changing the node 




of this finding will be used as a recommendation to make decision as to 
suppressed the likelihood successful attack of piracy and robbery for Port 
of Tanjung Perak.  
 
Table 4. 16 Range of Change by varying node Security 
Security 








The result of varying the value of states “Yes” in node Security is shown 
in Table 4.16. Based on findings it was known that by varying the value of 
states “Yes” in node Security creates an impact of 10.5%. The results 
present that changing the node ship itself leads to a likelihood attack as 
low as approximate 46.6% up to maximum 57.1%. Situation node mainly 
responsible for this impact as it is the parent node of node Security. This 
finding is based on result presented in Figure 4.7. By changing the node 
Situation alone can change the probability of an attack 26.6%. The result 
of this finding will be used as a recommendation to make decision as to 
suppressed the likelihood successful attack of piracy and robbery for Port 
of Tanjung Perak.  
 
Table 4. 17 Range of Change by varying node Environment 
Environment 








Table 4.17 show the result of varying the value of states “Favourable” 
in node Environment creates an impact of 3.4% change. The results 
present that changing the node Environment itself leads to a likelihood 





mainly responsible for this impact as it is the parent node of node Ship. 
This finding is based on result presented in Figure 4.8. By changing the 
node Situation alone can change the probability of an attack 13.4%. The 
result of this finding will be used as a recommendation to make decision 
as to suppressed the likelihood successful attack of piracy and robbery 
for Port of Tanjung Perak.  
 
4.9. Recommendation  
A summarize of finding due to varying the value of the root nodes to 
the node Attack table 4.18 is presented. 
 
Table 4. 18 Summarize Finding of Variation of Root Nodes 




Part of Day 8.3 
Compliance 3.2 
Capability 2 
E. Value 1.4 
Position 0.3 
 
This table present the value of changing the value of the root node as 
a single factor. Meaning that by only changing the value of the selected 
node, the value of node Attack is changing as shown on the table. The 
node is sorted according to its influence on changes in value of node 
Attack. Node Situation, Defence, and Weather is three of the nodes that 
has the highest influence to the likelihood of an attack. In order to 
suppressed the likelihood of Piracy and Robbery Attack in Port of Tanjung 
Perak the node Situation which has the highest effect to the likelihood of 
an attack of the must be prioritized and to be maintained at the assured 
level as possible. The Port must be kept guarded in the highest possible 
level to reduce the likelihood of an attack. A well-guarded situation of the 
port can reduce the likelihood of an attack up to 26.6%. If this scenario is 
applied the likelihood of an attack will be bellow 0.5 from the scale of 0-
1, one as the extreme likelihood of an attack to occur. To be precise the 
likelihood of an attack will be suppressed to 0.315 from the current 




changing only node Situation without considering any other node. To 
understand the meaning of value for other nodes can be done by the 
same comprehension concept. The presented result of Table 4.19 is a 
recommendation proposal by the author to reduce the likelihood of 
Piracy and Robbery Attack of Port of Tanjung Perak.  
 
Table 4. 19 Recommendation of actions 
No Action 
1 Create a clear state of sovereignty and control for security 
situation in waters 
2 Create a coordinated action between Port Security Committee 
(navy, police, army, coastguard, harbour master, etc) 
3 Create an intensified information gathering process, harmonised 
data assessment, provision of consistent reporting, and 
harmonised intelligence gathering 
4 Update patrolling schedule (routine checks and monitoring in all 
port areas, both land and sea) 
5 Update security procedures tailored to actual conditions in the 
field and manage coordination with relevant agencies 
6 Adding more security personnel 
7 Optimizing SOP and supervision  
8 Certification and training for all security officers in compliance 
to ISPS Code 
9 Training, Dill and Exercise according to Schedule and ISPS Code 
standard 
10 Installing Real time CCTV surveillance, Face Recognition & Plate 
Recognition 
11  Identification cards for people who enter the terminal area and 
must be accompanied with security officer 
12 Prepare security officers who accompany ticket attendants and 
inspection officers 
13 Installing Radio Over Internet Protocol 
14 Reassessment of Security Requirements 
 
Table 4.19 present recommendation of actions to upgrade security in 
the area of Port of Tanjung Perak to reduce the likelihood of attack. From 
the presented recommendation in order to enhance security level in Port 
of Tanjung Perak the recommendation proposed by this study is prioritize 





recommendation Risk Priority Number (RPN) Technique was used. A 
range of value from 1 to 5 is applied to assess each factor for each 
recommendation. 1 being very less and 5 being very high. The result of 
RPN for each recommendation is presented in Table 4.20 
 
No Action B T E Total 
1 
Create a clear state of sovereignty and 
control for security situation in waters 5 5 3 75 
2 
Create a coordinated action between Port 
Security Committee (navy, police, army, 
coastguard, harbour master, etc) 5 5 3 75 
3 
Create an intensified information gathering 
process, harmonised data assessment, 
provision of consistent reporting, and 
harmonised intelligence gathering 2 2 4 16 
4 
Update patrolling schedule (routine checks 
and monitoring in all port areas, both land 
and sea) 3 5 5 75 
5 
Update security procedures tailored to actual 
conditions in the field and manage 
coordination with relevant agencies 4 2 4 32 
6 Adding more security personnel 3 1 3 9 
7 Optimizing SOP and supervision  5 2 2 20 
8 
Certification and training for all security 
officers in compliance to ISPS Code 2 1 5 10 
9 
Training, Dill and Exercise according to 
Schedule and ISPS Code standard 4 1 4 16 
10 
Installing Real time CCTV survilance, Face 
Recognition & Plate Recognition 1 3 5 15 
11 
 Identification cards  for people who enter the 
terminal area and must be accompanied with 
security officer 3 5 2 30 
12 
Prepare security officers who accompany 
ticket attendants and inspection officers 3 1 4 12 
13 Installing Radio Over Internet Protocol 2 4 5 40 





Based on the result of RPN Calculation, it was obtained 3 
recommendation that is suggested by this study due to value of RPN is 
the highest. This recommendation was prioritized for immediate 
improvements to enhance security level in Port of Tanjung Perak based 
on 3 criteria that has mentioned before namely budget, time, and 
effectiveness. A number scale from 1-5 was given for each 
recommendation. For budget value 5 means that the budget needed to 
implement the recommendation given is very less and 1 means that the 
budget needed is significant. As for time value 5 means that the time 
needed to implement the recommendation is short and 1 means that it 
took a while to the recommendation come into force. And for 
effectiveness value 5 means that the recommendation proposed is very 
effective to enhance security in the port, and 1 means that the 
recommendation is less effective than other recommendation proposed. 
Those recommendation were as follow: 
• Create a clear state of sovereignty and control for security 
situation in waters 
• Create a coordinated action between Port Security Committee 
(navy, police, army, coastguard, harbour master, etc) 
• Update patrolling schedule (routine checks and monitoring in all 


































According to the research Bayesian Network Model for Piracy and 
Robbery Assessment of Tanjung Perak Port done it can be concluded 
that: 
1. Variable that potentially leads to successful attacks of piracy and 
robbery in Port of Tanjung Perak is determined. Variables were 
obtained through literature review as a hypothesis and is 
confirmed by analysing the report of attack happened from 2013-
2018. Variables that potentially leads to successful attacks are 
Economical Value, Compliance, Position, Weather, Part of a Day, 
Defense, Capability, Situation.  
2. Bayesian Network Model is developed to estimate the likelihood 
of successful attack of piracy and robbery in Port of Tanjung Perak. 
Variables that already determined is later processed and analysed 
thoroughly to fit the requirement of the model. An illustration of 
steps to developed Bayesian Network is presented bellows.  
 
3. Based on Bayesian Network Model created, the model points out 
which variable has the most significant impact to the likelihood of 
successful attack of Piracy and Robbery in Port of Tanjung Perak. 
The model created has find that Situation is the variables that 
highest effect to the likelihood of an attack of the must be 
prioritized and to be maintained at the assured level as possible. 
The Port must be kept guarded in the highest possible level to 
reduce the likelihood of an attack. A well-guarded situation of the 







1. As found in this research that Situation hold a significant impact to 
the likelihood of an attack happen, the author suggest that the 
guarding of the port must be prioritized and to be improved to a 
more secured level. 3 recommended actions to enhance security 
situation in the port are: 
a. Create a clear state of sovereignty and control for security 
situation in waters 
b. Create a coordinated action between Port Security Committee 
(navy, police, army, coastguard, harbour master, etc) 
c. Update patrolling schedule (routine checks and monitoring in all 
port areas, both land and sea 
2. Reporting of an incident must be improved. During this research 
the author find difficulties to find the report of an attack. Many of 
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Chronology Report of Attack Happen in 2013-2018 
2013 








11 The perpetrators of theft at the Port 
of Tanjung Perak, Surabaya, East Java 
were arrested. In each action, these 
perpetrators use trucks to transport 
stolen goods that are carried on the 
boat. the crime mode carried out by the 
perpetrators, during the day the 
suspects conducted a survey first in the 
target location. After getting the target, 
the perpetrator took the sack to 
transport the stolen goods. 
"In the evening, the perpetrators took 
the items they were targeting, then 
transported them in L 8090 WJ trucks, 








The gang of thieves who used to take 
action on a boat which was docked at 
the Port of Tanjung Perak, Surabaya, was 
successfully dismantled by the East Java 
Regional Police Chief of Police. This plot 
involved the crew  in carrying out the 
action. In disclosing this case, there were 
two suspects who were successfully 
secured by the police. This plot was 
arrested in the case of a container break 
in (KM) Alken Pikat which was docked on 
port of Tanjung Perak. The suspect 
Andriyanto and his partner damaged the 
bolts in the targeted container. Arriving 
at Tanjung Perak, he immediately 
contacted Ynt after the ship anchored. 
Furthermore, Ynt and his accomplice 
came to the boat using his fishing boat. 
In order not to be caught, the bolts of 





replaced with new bolts. So, it was 
impressed that the container was never 
opened 
2014 
No Date Evidence Chronology 
1 Wednesday, 
January 8, 
2014, at 2:00 
a.m. 
• 1 (one) roller 
lasing; 
• 1 (one) fruit 
closed 
manhole; 
• 1 (one) head 
of ventilation; 
• 1 (one) iron 
pipe; 




On Wednesday 08 January 2014 at 02.00 
WIB. The Patrol Boat X-1008 carried out 
a routine patrol led by the Head of the 
National Operations Office, which had 
inspected anonymous boats carrying 
goods in the form of 1 (one) roller lasing, 
1 (one) manhole lid, etc. Suspected of 
the proceeds of crime, then the boat was 
ad-hocked to Mako Ditpolair East Java 





• 24 boxes 
Mixed Fish as 
many as  or ± 
200 Kg 
• 1 (one) 
unnamed boat 
unit 
On Friday, January 31, 2014 when the 
Police vessel X-1008 conducted a patrol 
in the 10th section of the East Surabaya 
Watershed at around 11.00 WIB. Has 
carried out an nameless boat inspection 
which is transporting goods in the form 
of fish as many as 24 (twenty four) boxes, 
then the boat and boat crew and fish 
were taken to the East Java Regional 






• 39 Gen or ± 
1.365 L of 
solar  
• a boat 
without name   
At the time of KP. PIPIT - 3003 conducts 
a routine patrol to detect the presence 
of a boat (Without Name) by Nur Ghozali 
with a charge of 39 generals @ 35 liters 
or 1,365 liters, then an inspection and 
alleged violation of Article 374 and 
Article 480 jo article 55 of the Criminal 
Code concerning embezzlement and 




escorted to the base of the East Java 
Regional Police Directorate of Ditpolair 
for further investigation. 














A woman named DRA. LUKI INDRIANI 
on Monday, February 24, 2014 at 11.00 
WIB reported that there had been an 
alleged embezzlement of CPO Oil with 
proof of evidence as: 
- Reports on February 3, 2014 
about checking seals that found 
a broken seal at Manhole 
- Letter on February 8, 2014 
5 Tuesday, 
April 1, 2014 
at around 
5:00 a.m. . 
• 1 unnamed 
boat unit; 
• 8 iron 
hardener 
needles; 
• 12 iron shoe 
containers. 
On Tuesday, April 1, 2014 at around 5:00 
a.m. In Surabaya East Shipping Channel 
(APTS) at position 07 ° 11'401 "S-112 ° 
42'273" E, Police Ship X-1013 was 
lowering iron (container lasing 
equipment) then 3 (three) boat crew 
along with evidence it was brought to 
Mako Ditpolair East Java Regional Police 
for further examination. 
2015 





• 1 unnamed 
boat unit with 
13 PK Honda 
engine 
• 3 container 
chains with a 
length of ± 5 
meters 
• 6 pieces of 
spans screw 
containers 
• 4 pieces of 
container 
fittings 
On Sunday, March 1, 2015 at around 
05:30 WIB KP X-2001 Police Ship was 
carrying out a Thuggery Operation and 
at the time of carrying out the sweeping 
in the Surabaya East Shipping Channel 
region APTS found an unnamed boat 
carrying Old Iron, then 2 (two) unnamed 
boats and Old Iron boat were taken to 
Mako Ditpolair East Java Regional Police 





• 4 welding 
wire boxes @ 
5kg 
• 4 pieces of 
bendit plate 
Rp 700,000, 
2 • Sunday, 
September 






a. 1 (one) 3 kg 
elpigi gas 
cylinder 
b. 2 (two) 
oxygen tubes 
c. Welding 
hose ± 5 
meters 
d. 1 (one) 
small hammer 
e. 1 (one) 
blender 
f. 1 (one) 
wrench 
• 3 (three) 
pieces of iron 
buffer ± 30 
cm wide and 
± 2 mm thick 
• 1 (one) unit 
of Boat Eka 
On Monday, September 21, 2015 at 
around 21:30 WIB in the APBS Waters 
(Surabaya West Cruise Line) in position 
070 03 '746 "LS - 1120 38' 620" E. Police 
Ship X 1013 Ditpolair East Java Regional 
Police has examined the perpetrators 
theft of iron ship by cutting using 
welding and then the case was handed 
over to the East Java Police Ditpolair 
Investigator for further examination. 
2016 
No Date Evidence Chronology 
1 Sunday, 
April 24, 
2016 at 9:30 
a.m. 
• 1 Yamaha 
Brand 
generator set 
• 1 set of 
hacksaw 
• 1 size 19 
shock lock 
On Sunday, April 24, 2016 at around 9:30 
a.m., above TB. Niaga Mas 1 anchor / 
anchor in the waters Bouy Pisang Alur 
Pelayaran Barat Surabaya / APBS (west 
of ICT dock), visited by Br. Moh Gofar to 
ask for a drink. After being given a drink 




• 1 boat unit 
• 1 cutter 
knife 
1) Br. Moh. Gofar borrows a hacksaw and 
locks the shock, after the saw and the 
key to shock are taken from the ship's 
engine room and given by Br. Warman, 
Bro. Moh. Gofar returns to the boat. 
After 1 minute, Bro. Moh. Gofar with his 
colleague Bro. Heri returns to TB. Niaga 
Mas 1, when walking Moh. Gofar 
followed Bro. Warman into the TB 
kitchen. Niaga Mas 1, when walking, Bro. 
Moh Gofar is closing in on you Warman 
was in the kitchen door and pointed the 
saw towards the stomach and the knife 
towards the right side of the neck and 
threatened that Br. Warman doesn't 
move. After 1 minute, Bro. Warman 
heard that someone was lifting the 
generator engine from the engine room, 
then Bro. Warman heard the sound of 
the boat engine and Bro. Moh. Gofar ran 
and jumped on the boat and went 
straight to the Teluk Lamong harbor 
dock. After that Bro. Muskardi reported 
to the company office to ask for help. 
2 Sunday, July 
9 2016 





• 1 long blue 
red gas 
evaporation 
pipe ± 1 
meter 
• 1 red boat 
unit 
• 1 sickle 
At the time of KP X-2001, Ditpolair of 
East Java Regional Police headed by 
Aiptu Partika Guntur carried out a Patrol, 
getting information from the public that 
above one ship there is a theft. Then the 
officers came to the scene where the 
ship is meant to be lego anchor. After 
going to the scene, the officer gets 
information from the Ship Mechanic that 
there were several people boarded the 
ship by taking several items and the 
people in question were in Tug Boat. 
Then the officers came to Tug Boat. The 
visa met Faisal Imron and Mulyono's 





after a brief examination of the two 
perpetrators and found evidence of 
evidence according to what was 
conveyed by Br. Rafles, with initial proof. 
Then the perpetrators of a.n. Bro Faisol 
Imron was taken to Mako Ditpolair of 
East Java Regional Police to conduct 
further investigations, 1 (one) person 
who committed Mulyono fled when he 





11.00 wib  
 
• 1 (one) 
Unnamed 
Boat unit 





On Friday August 26, 2016 at around 
11.00 a man arrived at the East Java 
Regional Police's Ditpolair office and 
reported that on Friday 24 June 2016 at 
around 05:30 hours in the Madura Strait 
Tg. Perak Surabaya has stolen 1 (one) 
Man Over Boat unit and 1 (one) ship 
radar antenna done by 3 (three) 
perpetrators by using a nameless boat. 
And from one of the perpetrators 
threatened the crew by pointing the 
knife towards the crew. 
2018 
No Date Evidence Chronology 
1 Monday, 
September 





• 1 nozzle 
missing 
a. On Monday, September 17, 2018 at 
around 08:40 a.m., members of the 
North Security Jamrud Port received a 
report that the MV Indigo Silva had lost 
1 (one) Nozzle unit; 
b. Receiving the report, members of Port 
Security (PS) North Jamrud (JU) 
immediately coordinated with members 
of the Patrol PS post to coordinate with 
the ship, and PS Patrol immediately 
drove to the location and coordinated 
with the ship / ABK vessel MV officers. 




c. From checking correctly there is 1 
(one) nozzle in one missing and the 
position is on the sea side. based on the 
information from ABK, the nozzle 
disappeared around 24.00 WIB; 
d. To ensure that members of Port 
Security monitor from CCTV footage but 
for the sea side CCTV can not reach; 
e. And also conveyed to CCTV monitors 
that are on standby 1 (Patrol post) the 
network is often error because the 
network uses the Wireless System, so it 
cannot be maximized to monitor the 
occurrence of the loss; 
f. As a result of the shortage of the above 
mentioned bookstore, we cannot 
continue to invest and only receive 
reports and will carry out repairs on the 
security of both the port operator and 





Analysis of Chronology Report using Coding System 
2013 









11 The perpetrators of theft at the Port of Tanjung Perak, Surabaya, East 
Java were arrested. In each action, these perpetrators use trucks to transport 
stolen goods that are carried on the boat. the crime mode carried out by 
the perpetrators, during the day the suspects conducted a survey first in the 
target location. After getting the target, the perpetrator took the sack to 
transport the stolen goods. "In the evening, the perpetrators took the items 
they were targeting, then transported them in L 8090 WJ trucks, and then 

















The gang of thieves who used to take action on a boat which was docked 
at the Port of Tanjung Perak, Surabaya, was successfully dismantled by the 
East Java Regional Police Chief of Police. This plot involved the crew  in 
carrying out the action. In disclosing this case, there were two suspects who 
were successfully secured by the police. This plot was arrested in the case 
of a container break in (KM) Alken Pikat which was docked on port of 
Tanjung Perak. The suspect Andriyanto and his partner damaged the bolts 
in the targeted container. Arriving at Tanjung Perak, he immediately 
contacted Ynt after the ship anchored. Furthermore, Ynt and his accomplice 
came to the boat using his fishing boat. In order not to be caught, the bolts 
of previously damaged containers were replaced with new bolts. So, it was 














No Day, Date Evidence Report Keywords 
1 
Wednesday
, January 8, 
2014, at 
2:00 a.m. 
1 (one) roller 
lasing; 1 (one) 
fruit closed 
manhole; 1 
(one) head of 
ventilation; 1 
(one) iron pipe; 
3 (three) pieces 
of plate. 
On Wednesday 08 January 2014 at 02.00 WIB. The Patrol Boat X-1008 
carried out a routine patrol led by the Head of the National Operations 
Office, which had inspected anonymous boats  at 07 11’ 14” LS - 1120 
43’ 21” BT carrying goods in the form of 1 (one) roller lasing, 1 (one) 
manhole lid, etc. Suspected of the proceeds of crime, then the boat was 















24 boxes Mixed 
Fish as many as  
or ± 200 Kg, 1 
(one) unnamed 
boat unit 
On Friday, January 31, 2014 when the Police vessel X-1008 conducted a 
patrol in the 10th section of the East Surabaya Watershed (07 10’ 48” S 
- 1120 43’ 24” T) at around 11.00 WIB. Has carried out an nameless boat 
inspection which is transporting goods in the form of fish as many as 24 
(twenty four) boxes, then the boat and boat crew and fish were taken to 












12, 2014, at 
10:00 p.m. 
39 Gen or ± 
1.365 L of solar, 
a boat without 
name   
At the time of KP. PIPIT - 3003 conducts a routine patrol to detect the 
presence of a boat (Without Name) by Nur Ghozali with a charge of 39 
generals @ 35 liters or 1,365 liters, then an inspection and alleged 









concerning embezzlement and fencing, then the boat (Without Name) 
escorted to the base of the East Java Regional Police Directorate of 



















A woman named DRA. LUKI INDRIANI on Monday, February 24, 2014 at 
11.00 WIB reported that there had been an alleged embezzlement of 
CPO Oil with proof of evidence as:  -  Reports on February 3, 2014 about 

















boat unit, 8 
iron hardener 
needles, 12 iron 
shoe 
containers. 
On Tuesday, April 1, 2014 at around 5:00 a.m. In Surabaya East Shipping 
Channel (APTS) at position 07 ° 11'401 "S-112 ° 42'273" E, Police Ship 
X-1013 was lowering iron (container lasing equipment) then 3 (three) 
boat crew along with evidence it was brought to Mako Ditpolair East 





















boat unit with 
13 PK Honda 
engine, 3 
container 
chains with a 
length of ± 5 
meters, 6 







boxes @ 5kg, 4 
pieces of 
bendit plate, 
Rp 700,000, - 
On Sunday, March 1, 2015 at around 05:30 WIB KP X-2001 Police Ship 
was carrying out a Thuggery Operation and at the time of carrying out 
the sweeping in the Surabaya East Shipping Channel region APTS found 
an unnamed boat carrying Old Iron, then 2 (two) unnamed boats and 

















include: 1 (one) 
3 kg elpigi gas 
On Monday, September 21, 2015 at around 21:30 WIB in the APBS 
Waters (Surabaya West Cruise Line) in position 070 03 '746 "LS - 1120 
38' 620" E. Police Ship X 1013 Ditpolair East Java Regional Police has 












hose ± 5 
meters, 1 (one) 
small hammer, 
1 (one) blender, 
3 (three) pieces 
of iron buffer ± 
30 cm wide and 
± 2 mm thick,  
1 (one) unit of 
Boat Eka 
and then the case was handed over to the East Java Police Ditpolair 





              
2016 








generator set, 1 
set of hacksaw, 
1 size 19 shock 
lock, 1 boat 
On Sunday, April 24, 2016 at around 9:30 a.m., above TB. Niaga Mas 1 
anchor / anchor in the waters Bouy Pisang Alur Pelayaran Barat 
Surabaya / APBS (west of ICT dock), visited by Br. Moh Gofar to ask for 
a drink. After being given a drink by Br. Warman (Olie Man TB. Niaga 
Mas 1) Br. Moh. Gofar borrows a hacksaw and locks the shock, after the 
saw and the key to shock are taken from the ship's engine room and 











unit, 1 cutter 
knife 
minute, Bro. Moh. Gofar with his colleague Bro. Heri returns to TB. Niaga 
Mas 1, when walking Moh. Gofar followed Bro. Warman into the TB 
kitchen. Niaga Mas 1, when walking, Bro. Moh Gofar is closing in on you 
Warman was in the kitchen door and pointed the saw towards the 
stomach and the knife towards the right side of the neck and threatened 
that Br. Warman doesn't move. After 1 minute, Bro. Warman heard that 
someone was lifting the generator engine from the engine room, then 
Bro. Warman heard the sound of the boat engine and Bro. Moh. Gofar 
ran and jumped on the boat and went straight to the Teluk Lamong 
harbor dock. After that Bro. Muskardi reported to the company office to 
ask for help. G 
2 
Sunday, 
July 9 2016 
1 Dynasty 
brand 2000 volt  
Transformer 
unit, 1 long 
blue red gas 
evaporation 
pipe ± 1 meter, 
1 red boat unit, 
1 sickle 
At the time of KP X-2001, Ditpolair of East Java Regional Police headed 
by Aiptu Partika Guntur carried out a Patrol, getting information from 
the public that above one ship there is a theft. Then the officers came 
to the scene where the ship is meant to be lego anchor. After going to 
the scene, the officer gets information from the Ship Mechanic that 
there were several people boarded the ship by taking several items and 
the people in question were in Tug Boat. Then the officers came to Tug 
Boat. The visa met Faisal Imron and Mulyono's relatives carrying goods 
from the ship, after a brief examination of the two perpetrators and 
found evidence of evidence according to what was conveyed by Br. 
Rafles, with initial proof. Then the perpetrators of a.n. Bro Faisol Imron 
was taken to Mako Ditpolair of East Java Regional Police to conduct 
further investigations, 1 (one) person who committed Mulyono fled 




















unit, 3 (three) 
sheets of 
photos when 
the theft occurs 
On Friday August 26, 2016 at around 11.00 a man arrived at the East 
Java Regional Police's Ditpolair office and reported that on Friday 24 
June 2016 at around 05:30 hours in the Madura Strait Tg. Perak 
Surabaya has stolen 1 (one) Man Over Boat unit and 1 (one) ship radar 
antenna done by 3 (three) perpetrators by using a nameless boat. And 
from one of the perpetrators threatened the crew by pointing the knife 









              
2018 




17, 2018 at 
around 
08:40 a.m 
CCTV Record, 1 
nozzle missing 
a. On Monday, September 17, 2018 at around 08:40 a.m., members of 
the North Security Jamrud Port received a report that the MV Indigo 
Silva had lost 1 (one) Nozzle unit; b. Receiving the report, members of 
Port Security (PS) North Jamrud (JU) immediately coordinated with 
members of the Patrol PS post to coordinate with the ship, and PS Patrol 
immediately drove to the location and coordinated with the ship / ABK 
vessel MV officers. Indigo Silva and checking / investing; c. From 
checking correctly there is 1 (one) nozzle in one missing and the 
position is on the sea side. based on the information from ABK, the 
nozzle disappeared around 24.00 WIB; d. To ensure that members of 
Port Security monitor from CCTV footage but for the sea side CCTV can 












1 (Patrol post) the network is often error because the network uses the 
Wireless System, so it cannot be maximized to monitor the occurrence 
of the loss; f. As a result of the shortage of the above mentioned 
bookstore, we cannot continue to invest and only receive reports and 
will carry out repairs on the security of both the port operator and the 




















Probability Table for Each State 
 
 Code Causes 2013 2014 2015 2016 2018 Probability 
E. Value 
E1 Equipment 1 2 2 3 1 0.69230769 
E2 Cargo 1 3       0.30769231 
Position 
S1 Anchoring 2 2   2 1 0.53846154 
S2 Sailing   3 2 1   0.46153846 
Part of Day 
D1 Daylight   3   3 1 0.58333333 
D2 Night time 1 2 2     0.41666667 
Weather 
W1 Poor   1   1   0.15384615 
W2 Moderate  1 2 2 1   0.46153846 
W3 Good 1 2   1 1 0.38461538 
Defence 
N1 Personnel 1 1   1 1 0.28571429 
N2 Equipment 2 4 2 2   0.71428571 
Capability 
C1 Trained      0.32090909 
C2 Untrained      0.67909091 
Situation 
G1 Guarded      0.10209899 
G2 Unguarded      0.89790101 
Compliance 
P1 Comply      0.05172414 
P2 
Non-






















Existing Mitigation Plan 
No  LOCATION  MITIGATION STRATEGY 
1 Access, entrance, entrance to the port, and lego anchor area, ship and dock 
movement area 
A Entrance from the sea - Making PROTAP and Communication Nets 
- Entry Flow Monitoring 
- Determination of Patrol Schedule 
- Monitoring of the Pier Area 
Lego Anchor Area 
Flow into the port 
Ship movement area 
Dock area 
B Access from land  - Adding Security Personnel 
Door 
Fence 
2 Cargo facilities, terminals, goods stacking areas and loading and unloading 
equipment 
A Pier Facilities  - Add lighting 
- Marking 
- Monitoring stacking areas 
- Add immigration checks for international 
passengers 
- Prepare security officers who accompany 
ticket attendants and inspection officers 
- The porter in charge must wear a 
numbered uniform according to the 
employee's number 
B Terminal / Offices  
C Stacking Area 
3 Electric power generation, transfer of goods through pipes and water supply 
A Power plant  - Marking 
- Lock the electrical panel and secure it 
- Perform routine checks in the generator 
area 
- Optimizing SOP and supervision 
B Water supply 
4 Ships that provide services at the port, including guided ships, tugs and 
barges etc. 
A  Guide ship  - Optimizing SOP and supervision 
B  tugboat 
C Barge 
5 Security and equipment and security systems 
A Security Personnel  - Training / Training Dill and Exercise 





C Security system / 
procedure 
- All security officers must have a port 
security certificate 
- Update security procedures tailored to 
actual conditions in the field and manage 
coordination with relevant agencies 
- ISPS Code training for all certified security 
officers 
6 Waters around port facilities - Optimizing SOP and supervision 
- Conduct monitoring in all port areas, both 
land and sea 
7 Systems, such as electric power systems, radio systems and 
telecommunications as well as computer systems and networks 
A Electric Power System  - Making PROTAP and Communication Nets 
- Addition of Central Communication Room 
- Prepare a central communications room 
and install CCTV monitors in the PFSA 
room 
B Radio and 
communication systems 
C Computer network 
system 
8 Ship traffic management in ports and navigational aids 
A Management of ship 
traffic  
- Making PROTAP and Communication Nets 
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